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ARTICLES
Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the
Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum
James G. Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The long-standing jurisprudential controversy over whether courts should
utilize bright line rules or balancing tests has failed to inform sufficiently
lawyers and judges. For many years, most analysts contrasted rigid rules,
such as the United States Supreme Court's striking down all legislative
vetoes in L N.S. v. Chadha,' with conclusory standards, like Morrison v.
Olson's upholding special prosecutors because they did not "impermissibly
undermine the powers of the Executive Branch." 2  This stark dichotomy
between archetypal rules and standards can distract us from evaluating
courts' frequent application of other "forms of doctrine" and the foreseeable
effects of those other forms. The phrase "forms of doctrine" refers to such
doctrinal structures as exceptions, multiple factor tests, totality of the
circumstances tests, "escape hatches," and several other hybrid variants
(containing elements of both rules and standards), all of which can appear
separately or in myriad combinations in a particular substantive area.
The rule/standard debate has not only erred empirically by failing to
consider these other forms of doctrine, but many of the rule/standard
discussions have also used inappropriate substantive criteria to evaluate the
judiciary's employment of rules or standards. Professor Strauss, an
exponent of pragmatic functionalism, condemned Chadha's wholesale
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. A.B. 1969, Princeton University; J.D.
1974, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Sheldon Gelman, Pat McCoy, Candice Hoke,
Patty Falk, Steve Lazarus, and Phyllis Crocker for their assistance. The Cleveland-Marshall Fund
also contributed to this project.
1. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
2. 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988). Most of my examples are from constitutional law and
administrative law, the subject areas that have been the focal point of my teaching and research. I
believe this article's basic claims apply to all other doctrinal areas.
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repudiation of the legislative veto as woodenly "formalistic." 3  Professor
Henderson relied upon her feminist perspective to find the rule of law,
including formal rules, "authoritarian." 4  Professor Aleinikoff generally
disapproved of balancing tests, 5 while Professor Boyle found the choice
between standards to be another verification of the Critical Legal Studies'
claim of the indeterminacy of judicial rhetoric. 6  On the other hand,
Professor Schauer has praised rules. For example, he characterized
exceptions as the intersection of two rules.7  Professor Entin considered
3. Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme
Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 818 [hereinafter Strauss, Baby]; see also
Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions: A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987). For additional critical discussion, see E. Donald
Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto,
1983 SuP. CT. REV. 125, 131-44, and Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About
Legislative-Extecutive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 471 (1987) (arguing that
Chadha's definition of legislative action was circular). For a more favorable view, see Harold H.
Bruff, Symposium on Administrative Law: The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 491 (1987) (Chadha enhanced congressional accountability to the
electorate).
4. Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379 (1991); see
also Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543 (1986); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations of Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988). Professor Michelman thought that Justice O'Connor's
affinity for balancing tests might reflect a feminine perspective. Frank Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17 n.68, 33-36
(1986).
5. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987).
6. James A. Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1985). At one
time, the leading Critical Legal Studies scholar Duncan Kennedy attacked rules. Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Along with
other critical legal scholars, he argued that the legal system's deviations from rules demonstrates a
crisis of liberalism. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); ROBERTO
M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 63-103 (1975); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987).
7. Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (1991) [hereinafter Schauer,
Exceptions]. No recent legal scholar has wrestled with rules as much as Professor Schauer.
Schauer has advocated the use of formal rules. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism]; Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 455, 470 (1989). For a Kantian defense of rules, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism:
On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). See also Robert F. Nagel, Liberals
and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 (1992) (balancing favors liberal, activist, academic
lawyers).
Professor Schauer's recent book on rules demonstrates how rules allocate power and discretion
to different parts of our society. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 98, 158-
62 (1991). It is undesirable to formulate all rules to allocate all power to a single source in a
constitutional system that is premised upon the dispersal of power. Although the Supreme Court
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Supreme Court vacillations between formalism and functionalism in
separation of powers decisions like Chadha and Morrison to be
"inconsistent. ,8
The Supreme Court has also contentiously considered this question. For
instance, Justice Stevens has generally favored standards, proposing a
universal "rationality" test in equal protection cases instead of the existing
three-tiered approach of strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the
rational purpose test.9 Justice Scalia has exacerbated the polarity with
caustic commentary supporting his biding preference for rules. 1°  For
example, he did not consider Morrison's conclusory standard even to be
"law"9:
[T]he governing standard is to be what might be called the
unfettered wisdom of a majority of this Court, revealed to an
obedient people on a case-by-case basis. This is not only not the
should assert its own power, it also ought to disperse powers to the other two federal branches, the
states, juries, lower courts, individual citizens, and even future Supreme Courts. There are good
reasons to distrust any of these decision-makers, but the Court nevertheless frequently must allocate
discretionary power to all of them if society is to function. The real question is when to give
different authorities discretion via standards, not whether to ever give them discretion.
Professor Schauer's book is more ambivalent about standards than some of his previous
writings. He praises rules for serving reliability, predictablility, and certainty. Id. at 96-99. Rules
also focus courts by excluding evidence. Id. at 88. But when he turns to standards, he seems less
hostile than before. For example, he initially claims that the vague standard, "best interest of
child," is not really rule-based. Id. at 11. But he later observes that the "reasonableness" standard
is still a rule. Id. at 104 n.35. His major example, excluding dogs from restaurants, generates a
rule against dogs in restaurants. Id. at 31. But he does not reject the alternative standard
precluding all "boisterous" dogs from restaurants; it merely implies a different rule. Id. at 63. In
other words, the creation of the appropriate rule raises contextual, cost-benefit questions. Id. at
142.
8. Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of
Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 210 (1990). Other legal scholars have voiced similar
criticisms. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U.
PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984).
9. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 88-90 (1991). Professor Kahn criticized Justice Powell for
overly balancing community norms against individual rights. Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the
Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 56-59
(1987).
10. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989). Professor Nagel also preferred rules to standards. Robert F. Nagel, The Fomulaic
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985). Justice Black advocated clear rules. See Michael J.
Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B. U.
L. REV. 25, 36 (1994); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 148-61
(1960) (arguing that standards are contrary to the "rule of law").
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government of laws that the Constitution established; it is not a
government of laws at all. 1
Nevertheless, the debate has recently become somewhat less polarized.
Judge Posner's pragmatism embraces both rules and standards. 2  While
Professor Sullivan concluded that judges of any ideology can and will
formulate rules or standards, she also observed that the Supreme Court's
political "center" prefers balancing tests.13 Even Justice Scalia conceded
that he must sometimes balance, reinforcing the growing belief that the
rule/standard dichotomy exists on a continuum. 15 These views resemble the
position I took some years ago that formal rules, that is, "doctrinal
formalism," should coexist with balancing tests, because both rules and
standards can generate the appropriate solution to a particular constitutional
problem. 16
This article's primary contribution to the rule/standard problem is to map
the rule/standard continuum more precisely. This article will analyze several
cases to reveal numerous forms of doctrine that are hybrids of the two
archetypes, "rules" and "standards," including the aforementioned escape
hatches, exceptions, and factor tests, and will also discuss costs and benefits
of using each of these different forms, irrespective of substance. Judges
must choose among a large number of valid forms, attempting to create the
best "fit" between the chosen form, a judicial means, and higher-level ends,
such as efficiency, social stability, consistency, or autonomy.
The article will then utilize the lessons gained from its survey of the
rule/standard problem to reevaluate the more theoretical controversy over
ii. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712. Justice Scalia's claim that Morrison was not "law" triggers
the complex debate over the meaning of the word "law." During a discussion about this article,
Professor Durchslag, Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
characterized Scalia's argument as a claim that only formal rules are "objective law" under the
"rule of law." This article is already attempting enough without defining "objective," "law," and
"rule of law." However, any definition of those three massive terms that precludes all hybrids and
all balancing tests should also convince us why such a massive disruption of existing legal doctrine
is justified.
The tension between theory and practice also informs the debate over constitutional
interpretation. The best "refutation" of Raoul Berger's strict originalism is that he would have to
overrule the desegregation opinion in Brown v. Board of Education. See RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 117-
33, 363-72 (1977) (discussing segregated schools).
12. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-53 (1990).
13. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 100-03.
14. Scalia, supra note 10, at 1187. "We will have totality of the circumstances tests and
balancing modes of analysis with us forever-and for my sins, I will probably write some of the
opinions that use them. All I urge is that those modes of analysis be avoided where possible." Id.
15. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 58.
16. James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 436 (1983).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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rules and standards. The choice of form of doctrine should be perceived as
primarily a question of technique, not a manifestation of grand legal theory.
Judges have properly created a diverse menu of forms to choose from,
reflecting the complexity and uncertainty of the world they attempt to
regulate. In other words, the numerous forms of doctrine demonstrate that
the rule/standard dichotomy is empirically misleading and normatively
wrong. The article will then query why many capable lawyers, judges, and
legal theorists have characterized the formation of rules and standards, or
both, as symptoms (often diseased) of particular ideologies. 17  One of the
risks of the American legal culture's preference for theory is that theorists
often eagerly apply a critique that may be valid or at least illuminating at one
level of abstraction, such as moral-political philosophy, to another level of
abstraction, in this case, the technical problem of formulating appropriate
doctrine for a particular legal problem. Professor Noam Chomsky's left-
wing views, for instance, describe odious aspects of American political and
economic culture, 18 but his analysis cannot resolve the technical problems
that courts face in creating proper doctrine in all substantive legal areas. To
implement their agenda effectively, Chomskyite judges should use rules,
standards, and hybrids. To make the point more globally, a judge ought to
choose the form of doctrine that makes the best compromise between often
conflicting ends, which the judge's normative philosophy established and
ranked at a higher level.
This recurring error of commingling analysis of ends (such as justice,
equality, efficiency, the role of the judiciary, or even flexibility) with means
(like rules or standards) is understandable, because each form of doctrine
advances a subset of substantive ends. Formal rules limit future judicial
discretion' 9 and generate predictability and consistency, while vague
standards preserve the needed flexibility to respond to unique or
unforeseeable circumstances. Once rules have been created, judges find
them easier to apply, thereby saving judicial time and mental energy-two
17. But see POSNER, supra note 12, at 44, 256; Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 106-09 (1983).
18. See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, CHRONICLES OF DISSENT (1992); EDWARD S. HERMAN &
NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988).
19. Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 4, 7-9, 21-22 (1987).
20. The rule/standard debate immediately triggers concerns over stare decisis. Malleable
standards create less precedential problems than rigid rules, because future courts may be forced to
overrule rules to achieve desired results. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 134 ("[R]ules limit ...
the circumstances in which judges consider themselves free to overrule previous cases (that is, stare
decisis.)").
27:7731
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scarce commodities. 21 But the internally conflicting judicial process ends of
predictability, consistency, and flexibility are not a court's only concerns.
The judiciary must weigh those conflicts while also furthering inharmonious
substantive ends, ranging from protecting free speech and maintaining order
under the First Amendment to encouraging inventiveness via patent law.
22
The courts' creation of such a diverse set of doctrinal forms puts both
sides of the rule/standard controversy in an awkward position.
Jurisprudential purists who condemn either archetypal bright lines or
balancing tests should also reject all hybrids, which contain elements of both
archetypes. But that repudiation would undermine massive amounts of
doctrine and improperly constrain the judiciary in the future, constituting a
dubious triumph of theory over judicial and social experience. The
controversy should not be over whether courts should ever use any of the
particular techniques of rules, standards, or hybrids. The far more difficult
issue is deciding when the court should employ a particular form in light of
all the competing concerns.
On a more practical level, this article offers several options, supported by
precedent and analysis, that litigants can offer judges who want to proceed in
a certain direction, but also wish to hedge their positions. The article also
provides an additional method to distinguish cases beyond the voluminously
discussed distinctions based upon fact, dicta, or policy. Courts can
profoundly alter law by transforming existing forms of doctrine.
II. CATEGORIZING THE FORMS OF DOCTRINE
This section describes some of the forms of doctrine that co-exist along
the rules/standard continuum. The list is not meant to be exhaustive.
Additional forms probably exist, and courts remain inventive. 23 The survey
starts with rigid rules and proceeds to conclusory standards. Thus, the
organizing motif is each form's tendency toward "ruleness," toward
predictability and reduction of future discretion, both by the judiciary and by
21. Id. at 53, 143; see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 572 (1992) ("The difference in promulgations costs favors standards, whereas that
in enforcement costs favors rules."). Consequently, rules work better to resolve frequent, recurring
events. Id. at 577.
22. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). For realist criticisms of judicial rules, see
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977) (castigating legal formalism) and JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (condemning "rule fetishes").
23. Judge Posner, for example, transformed a multiple-factor test into an algorithm. See
American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1986).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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the parties regulated by the rule. However, the forms overlap in theory and
practice. Consequently, placements along the continuum are somewhat
arbitrary; judicial application of a form of doctrine reveals at least as much
about the form's predictability as examination of the form's structure or
words. The following case examples demonstrate how different forms can
provide the best "fit" with judicial ends.24
A. I.N.S. v. Chadha and Vividly Bright Lines
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in I.N.S. v. Chadha25 combines daring
breadth with excessive artificiality to decide correctly the particular issue and
the appropriate form of doctrine, which was a rigid constitutional rule.26
Chadha, a legal alien, faced deportation after an adverse administrative
hearing, but the United States Attorney General decided that Chadha could
remain in the United States .27 Pursuant to the applicable statute, the case
was referred to the House of Representatives. Without conducting a
hearing, the Chair of a House subcommittee told the entire House that
Chadha should be deported. The House of Representatives used the
statutory legislative veto to reverse the Attorney General, thereby rendering
28
a final decision to deport Chadha. Arguing that all congressional vetoes
were "legislative" and that all congressional "legislative" actions had to
comply with the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, the Chief Justice all
but invalidated the entire legislative veto system. 29  His bright line rule
extended the opinion far beyond a single deportation.
30
Unlike its outcome, Chief Justice Burger's opinion was riddled with
flaws, all of which initially appear to support Professor Strauss's complaint
that the Supreme Court blundered by creating bright line rules in several
24. Judge Posner has described "reason" as the proper fitting of ends and means. POSNER,
supra note 12, at 107.
25. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
26. The Supreme Court can create extremely rigid rules in constitutional cases. In statutory
cases, Congress always can rewrite a statute to overrule a prior judicial holding, including that
holding's form. Nevertheless, a judicial statutory decision can generate a rule that is as effectively
formalistic as any constitutional decision, at least until the legislative branch changes the interpreted
law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been more reluctant to overrule statutory decisions than
constitutional ones. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-85 (1972) (refusing to apply antitrust to
baseball industry due to prior precedent that romanticized baseball as not being a business).
27. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923.
28. Id. at 927.
29. Id. at 952-59.
30. At the time, 196 statutes contained 295 legislative vetoes. Id. at 944 (citing James
Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on
Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977)).
27:7731 779
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 779 1995
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
separation of powers cases. 31  First, Chief Justice Burger rejected Justice
Powell's narrower concurrence, which held that Congress acted "judicially"
by attempting to deport Chadha, thereby violating separation of powers.*
By directly threatening only those congressional vetoes that involved
adjudications of individual rights, Justice Powell's concurrence complied
with Justice Brandeis' proposition that the Supreme Court should not decide
more than is necessary in constitutional cases.
The Chief Justice's analysis that Congress acted "legislatively" was also
somewhat conclusory. 34  Chadha's deportation proceeding seemed
"executive" when reviewed by the Attorney General, "legislative" while
being summarily processed in Congress, and "adjudicative" before the
courts and in the initial administrative hearing . 5 As Justice Stevens noted in
a later separation of powers case, governmental functions resemble
chameleons, "often tak[ing] on the aspect of the office to which it is
assigned. " 36 Of course, the definitional problem's plasticity reinforces the
Chief Justice's argument that congressional action is presumptively
legislative.
37
Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger used only two modes of argument:
text and history. Such a limited inquiry was inappropriate in this case.
Federal administrative agencies have largely emerged outside constitutional
text; their combination of executive, judicial, and legislative function flaunts
any rigid conception of separation of powers. Congress arguably needed
extratextual devices to constrain extratextual agencies. In terms of history,
the Framers were almost as worried about executive tyranny as legislative
31. Strauss, Baby, supra note 3, at 789-92; see Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality,
Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REv. 207, 212-13 (1984); see also Elliott, supra note 3, at
134 ("The core of the Court's reasoning is conceptual and formalistic .... ").
32. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959, 965.
33. Compare id. at 967 (Powell, J., concurring) with Ashwater v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
34. It has also been argued that the Court should pragmatically use formal definitions of
phrases like "executive" and "legislative," instead of engaging in functionalist balancing in
separation of powers cases. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to
Govern": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449,
454 (1991). The better solution is to sometimes create formal rules, as in Chadha, and sometimes
balance, as in Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor or when validating administrative
agencies' commingling all three governmental functions. See Commodities Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
35. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 750 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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tyranny. 38 The Framers also had reacted against the inefficient government
created by the Articles of Confederation, undercutting the Chief Justice's
eschewal of efficiency as a relevant constitutional norm. 39 The Chief Justice
made no policy arguments, such as arguing that congressional vetoes gave
too much power to special interests and lobbyists, who could work with
congressional members to implement and change policy in a relatively quiet
way. It is romantic to believe that the Supreme Court should not and does
not care about consequences; judges should consider the impact of their
decisions. As Justice Jackson explained, separation of powers doctrine has
the twin purposes of preventing tyranny and facilitating effective
governance.
Chadha also arguably failed to achieve its objectives. Louis Fisher
41
observed that Congress quickly circumvented the decision. Congress
42
requires agencies to notify it before making particular decisions. Congress
provides general funding authorizations to agencies while stipulating in66 43
"appropriation reports" how the money should be spent. If an agency
wants continued appropriations, political support, and benign oversight, it
should not change its planned allocations without first consulting the relevant
members of Congress."
1. The "Rule of Recognition" Validates Chadha
Despite all the above reservations, the Chadha opinion is validated by
Professor H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition. "45 Professor Hart argued that
38. The Declaration of Independence catalogued King George's abuses. John Locke, who
influenced the Framers, observed that the Executive is the most dangerous branch. JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 410 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
39. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
40. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. ").
41. Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
162-83 (1985).
42. Id. at 183.
43. CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL 93 (1988). Based upon such
tactics, Foreman concluded that "[t]he Chadha decision did not fundamentally alter the nature of the
American legislative process." Id. at 143.
44. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1941) (upholding report-and-wait
requirements).
45. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-23 (2d ed. 1994). The American Constitution
contains a set of explicit "secondary rules" that tells the Court and society when and how laws are
created. Professor Hart uses the phrase "rule of recognition" in different ways. His ultimate rule
of recognition is a social fact, not a legal fact. Id. at 112. This article is not referring to that
ultimate rule of recognition. We all need to first agree that the Constitution is the relevant authority
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 781 1995
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every sophisticated legal system needs "secondary rules" that inform society
as to which phenomena are binding governmental laws. 46 Although Hart did
not make the following claim, secondary rules should be few and simple,
enabling everyone to know what is or is not law. Such clarity is particularly
important for analyzing the most potent form of majoritarian legal authority
in American society, congressional legislation. Congressional statutes reside
just below the Constitution in American legal hierarchy, trumping treaties,
administrative regulations, executive orders, virtually all state laws,47 and
most judicial decisions. Several congressional laws, such as the federal
statute fixing at nine the number of Justices on the Supreme Court, have
enormous constitutional implications. It is crucial for all of us, not just the
Supreme Court, to know when Congress has exercised its power.
By requiring all external congressional laws4 8 to satisfy the Constitution's
few procedural mandates, Chief Justice Burger brought needed predictability
and certainty to the Constitution's rule of recognition4 9  Consequently,
Justice Powell's limiting distinction only delayed the desired outcome-the
elimination of all legislative vetoes.5° In other words, Chadha makes the
American legal system simpler and more comprehensible; ends that are
related to, but different than, accountability.
Political concerns about special interest group dominance or
congressional end runs become less relevant when viewed from the rule of
recognition perspective. The Supreme Court has a fundamental
constitutional responsibility to ensure that everyone knows what is and is not
law .5  Preventing bad faith application of those clear-cut rules of recognition
before we can do anything else. Chadha raises questions about how to interpret the Constitution's
"rule of recognition" of subsequent congressional law; it involves a "secondary rule." According
to Hart, courts decide "the most fundamental constitutional rules," id. at 153, creating "rules of
recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change," id. at 115. Of course,
the Constitution also contains normative standards of justice. Id. at 203.
46. Hart's definition of secondary rules includes the jurisdictional components of Article III:
"[T]he existence of a court entails the existence of secondary rules conferring jurisdiction on a
changing succession of individuals and so making their decisions authoritative." Id. at 136.
47. The Supreme Court has recently interpreted the Tenth Amendment to preclude Congress
from regulating state laws. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (Congress
cannot force states either to regulate nuclear waste or to take title to private nuclear waste); Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1990) (dicta asserting that Congress cannot extend age
discrimination laws to state judges).
48. Congress does not have to comply with Chadha's rule of recognition when engaging in
internal, investigatory, or oversight functions.
49. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958.
50. See id.
51. The rule of recognition, created by the House of Lords, is the most important element of
the English legal system. The Lords cannot overturn any law that has passed through the House of
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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primarily rests with the body politic. Congress can negotiate with agencies
without violating the formal rule of recognition, but Congress cannot expect
the courts to legally compel the agencies to honor those informal
negotiations. If the public does not like Congress using such indirect
pressures, they can vote in new members. In addition, basing core
constitutional separation of powers doctrine on political science may be as
risky as grounding core individual rights on sociology, as the Supreme Court
erroneously did in Brown v. Board of Education. First, political science
can be wrong. Second, political science changes as new events, trends, and
ideologies percolate through society. Third, unintended consequences often
frustrate judicial ambitions. The Court would be seeking to accomplish too
much if it designs constitutional doctrine to prevent Congress from being
dominated by special interests.
Professor Bruff praised Chadha for making congressional processes more
accountable, 53 but Louis Fisher has shown how Congress has accomplished
many of its same goals in a more stealthy fashion than before. 54 A phone
call or memorandum establishing informal spending criteria is far less public
than a legislative veto. Thus, Chadha increased congressional accountability
by forcing Congress to pass new laws but also pressured Congress to employ
more devious means. If one justifies Chadha largely on the need for a clear
rule of recognition, which clarifies the constitutional structure and guarantees
notice to all parties, instead of primarily on accountability grounds, the
case's lack of significant impact suddenly becomes a virtue, not a defect.
Chadha protects the rule of recognition, which is the most the Court could
hope to accomplish in the situation. Overall, Chadha is simultaneously an
affirmation of judicial power, calling hundreds of congressional laws into
question, and judicial restraint, creating a simple rule that does not
drastically disturb the existing distribution of political powers. Nothing
better could serve the limited end of determining what is or is not preeminent
congressional law than Chadha's broad, rigid rule.
55
Commons, House of Lords, and the Queen. Nor can any Parliament bind its successors. See
COLIN R. MUNRO, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-108 (1987).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Professor Cahn criticized Brown for placing such an important
right on such an unreliable foundation. Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150,
168 (1955).
53. Bruff, supra note 3, at 507.
54. FISHER, supra note 41, at 162-83.
55. The Court properly has been more reluctant to closely scrutinize internal congressional
proceedings. However, it has required Congress to comply with the Origination Clause's
requirement that all revenue bills begin in the House of Representatives. United States v. Munoz-
Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). The Court should have adopted Justice Scalia's concurring argument
of complete deference to all bills that congressional leaders from both Houses have attested to being
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Whether the reader agrees with this additional defense of Chadha is
secondary to the analysis of rules, standards, and hybrids. This article will
show how different forms pragmatically achieve different ends; it does not
completely defend the ultimate results of these examples. For the sake of
subsequent arguments, merely assume that Chadha's simple, rigid rule best
satisfies the need for a clear, rigid rule of recognition of congressional
56legislation, a desirable substantive goal. That assumption enables us to
sweep aside several misunderstandings about the place of formal rules within
the American legal system.
2. Misunderstandings Regarding Formal Rules
The previous section demonstrated how a decision may "correctly"
resolve the immediate controversy and choose the best form of doctrine, both
of which will influence future related cases, even when the opinion's
reasoning is unpersuasive. Chief Justice Burger's narrow focus on text in
the area of administrative law, which has emerged primarily outside
constitutional text, his distorted history, and his unwillingness to provide
pragmatic reasons weaken, but do not invalidate his results.
In addition, rules can be "judicially active," if one defines that
acrimonious phrase as the judicial assertion of its power of judicial review
over the other political branches through findings of unconstitutionality.
in compliance. Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., concurring). Instead, the Court held that it would strike
down all bills that had the "purpose" of raising revenues instead of bills that "incidentally raised
revenues." Id. at 397 (citing 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 880 (3d
ed. 1858), quoted in Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897)). This is an inquiry
that entangles the Court within congressional internal process.
56. Judges who often disagree on the merits nevertheless see the value of strict rules in a
variety of contexts. Justice Souter explained why bus companies have to pay a full sales tax on their
ticket sales even though much of the trip took place out of state: "[There is no reason to leave the
line of longstanding precedent and lose the simplicity of our general rule sustaining sales tax
measured by full value, simply to carve out an exception for the subcategory of sales of interstate
transportation services." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1344
(1995). Justice Thomas's opposition to an expansive district court school desegregation remedy
combined history, form, and substance: "At the very least, given the Federalists' public
explanation during the ratification of the federal equity power, we should exercise the power to
impose equitable remedies only sparingly, subject to clear rules guiding its use." Missouri v.
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2070 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas has not elevated form over substance. Concurring with the decision that
proscribes Congress from prohibiting firearms on public school grounds, he conceded that the
dissent's high level of deference generated a rule: "The one advantage of the dissent's standard is
certainty: it is certain under its analysis everything may be regulated under the guise of the
Commerce Clause." United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1650 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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After all, Chadha's rule invalidated 195 congressional statutes containing
legislative vetoes. Justice Scalia's rule formalism, for instance, would
require the Supreme Court to strike down many majoritarian innovations
concerning administrative agencies, ranging from special prosecutors 57 and
sentencing commissions58 to independent regulatory agencies. 59 Thus, rules
do not necessarily reduce judicial power or increase judicial restraint.
Chadha also demonstrates how rules can simultaneously reduce future
judicial discretion and expand judicial power, depending upon the party
being constrained by the particular rule. Chadha's rule moderately
increased both executive and judicial power at the expense of Congress.
Congress can only overturn executive action by passing a new law, which
may be vetoed and remains subject to judicial review. If the legislative veto
had been upheld, who knows what scope of review, if any, the Court would
have applied to subsequent vetoes? The Court could have found the issue
nonjusticiable. Conversely, judicial rules can limit both future judicial
discretion and judicial power. Justice White's Chadha dissent, which was
highly deferential to Congress, would have created by its application a rule
giving Congress almost complete discretion to create and apply legislative
vetoes.
Nor are rules directly related to "originalism," despite Chadha's
exclusive, excessive reliance on text and histor, which are originalism's
only legitimate modes of constitutional rhetoric. This article has provided
a more pragmatic reason to support Chadha: the desirability of a clear rule
of recognition to determine when Congress has exercised its formal, external
legislative power. Furthermore, it is hard to be relentlessly originalist in
administrative law; most of that Fourth Branch arose a century after the
original Constitution was ratified. 62  How can we possibly know what the
Framers thought or would have thought about a form of government that
they had never seen? In other words, there is no direct relationship between
formal rules and the constitutional dispute over the valid modes of
57. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988).
58. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
59. Justice Scalia's Morrison argument that all executive functions need to be under
presidential supervision undermines all independent regulatory agencies. See 487 U.S. at 705
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. 462 U.S. at 997 (White, J., dissenting) ("In a democracy it is the electorate that holds the
legislators accountable for the wisdom of their choices.").
61. See generally BERGER, supra note 11.
62. There is a poor relationship between originalism and judicial activism. For starters, a
judicial return to 1789 would require the Supreme Court to prohibit paper money and eliminate
most of the New Deal regulatory state.
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argument-text, history, policy, precedent, and the like. A pragmatic
functionalist can be a doctrinal formalist.
63
Next, judicial formulation of rules does not depend upon the form of
constitutional text. Admittedly, the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses,
by their specificity, present additional good reasons for a strict rule. But
rules can properly be extrapolated from amorphous texts. For example, the
Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to proscribe all racist
laws. 64 Conversely, the Court has construed the relatively determinate text
of Article III to permit Congress to allocate some Article III common law
issues to congressional agencies so long as Congress does not "impermissibly
threaten" the "institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch." 65  In Planned
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, the plurality interpreted the
amorphous doctrine of substantive due process to create two forms: a bright
line at viability striking down bans on abortions and an "undue burden"
balancing test that will tolerate some but not all state abortion regulations.
66
Finally, even the most rigid of constitutional rules only partially limits
future judicial discretion and judicial power. Rules make future outcomes
more predictable only when future judges abide by them. Chadha, for
instance, always needs at least five supportive Justices to remain viable.
Consequently, formal rules limit the discretion of other governmental actors
much more than the Court, which can always overrule or distinguish existing
rules. To summarize, no direct correlation exists between formal rules and
judicial power, judicial activism, or modes of argument.
B. Double Rules
The technical problem of creating the right form to solve a particular
legal issue is not limited to constitutional law. In United States v. Florida
63. Wilson, supra note 16, at 436.
64. "Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such [racial]
restrictions; racial antagonism never can . . . ." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (upholding internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II).
65. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
66. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816, 2821 (1992). This methodology also improves statutory analysis.
For instance, a lawyer would usually advise her client to settle after being caught driving seventy
miles an hour in violation of a rule limiting the speed limit to fifteen miles an hour in a school zone
during school hours. Yet lawyers and judges instinctively recognize a more contentious case had
the client only been charged with "reckless driving" on a snowy expressway, a standard that forces
them to balance and contextualize all the facts.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 786 1995
FORMS OF DOCTRINE
East Coast Railway Co., 67 then-Justice Rehnquist decided that the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which had promulgated regulations to reduce a
chronic freight-car shortage, need not provide formal rulemaking procedures
under sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
which require cross-examination, oral testimony, and the like.68 He
concluded that the agency did not have to provide formal rulemaking,
because section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act 9 only required the
agency to formulate rules "after hearing." 70 Rehnquist interpreted the word
"hearing" to only require the APA's informal rulemaking process under
section 553(b), which mandates notice and an opportunity to comment.71
Furthermore, the enabling statute did not use the APA's text at section
553(c), which establishes more formal requirements "[w]hen rules are
required by statute to be made on the record after an opportunity for an
agency hearing . . . 72 Justice Rehnquist's textualism supported the
congressional effort under the APA to empower agencies with the faster,
simpler informal rulemaking, a process that litigants often find more difficult
to challenge because of its simplicity and its less developed record.
But Congress could still require formal rulemaking by conditioning its
grant of rulemaking authority on the agency providing an "opportunity for a
hearing on the record." Thus, the Florida East Coast court created two
clear-cut rules echoing the dual structure of formal and informal hearings
within the APA. The two rules complement each other, making the APA
more coherent. They fulfill the APA's underlying purpose of providing two
ways to create substantive rules. One simply looks at the enabling statute's
text, which grants rulemaking authority,73 to determine if the agency must
comply with formal or informal rulemaking procedures under the APA.
Predicting future litigation outcomes becomes very easy. But one cannot
foresee which avenue Congress will prefer in the future-whether formal or
informal rulemaking will predominate. Only Congress can determine if
formal or informal rulemaking will be exceptional.
67. 410 U.S. 224 (1973); see also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S.
742, 757 (1972). Florida East Coast confirmed the similar Supreme Court holding in Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel.
68. Florida East Coast, 410 U.S. at 227-28.
69. 54 Stat. 901 (1940) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 11122 (1988)).
70. Florida East Coast, 410 U.S. at 225-26 & n. 1.
71. Id. at 241-42.
72. Id. at 234-35.
73. Agencies cannot create substantive rules without express statutory authorization.
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C. Bright Line Escape Hatches
The two previous sections did not attempt to "prove" the desirability of
Chadha's rigid rule or Florida East Coast's double rule. Mathematical-type
proofs appear to be impossible in this normative realm. 74 Persuasion is a
law review article's only weapon. This section develops the article's defense
of formal rules (and embarks on its advocacy of balancing tests) by studying
a hybrid form of doctrine that resides very close to unyielding rules, a form
labeled "bright line escape hatches." A "bright line escape hatch" exists
when a judge expressly leaves a tiny opening to soften the impact of an
otherwise rigid rule. The escape hatch metaphor creates the sense of a
minute, normally inaccessible possibility, available only in extreme
situations. By providing an opening that reduces pressure on the underlying
rule, the escape hatch strengthens that rule. Escape hatches permit the
courts to formulate rigid doctrine, even though the judges cannot envision all
possible issues and all potential abuses that might arise. To develop the
metaphor a bit more, escape hatches let off steam that otherwise might
rupture a rigid rule.
Nonjusticiability, for instance, is a very formal doctrine. It is
jurisdictional in tone, a conclusion that a particular issue should not be in the
courthouse but ought to be resolved by the political branches. Although the
Supreme Court has rarely found nonjusticiability under any of the six criteria
set forth in Baker v. Carr,75 the defendant is assured of victory whenever the
Court determines that one of those tests is controlling. However, Justice
O'Connor's dicta in New York v. United States, a Tenth Amendment case,
asserted that not all claims arising under a particular constitutional text are
76
necessarily either justiciable or nonjusticiable. The problem did not remain
hypothetical for long. Nixon v. United States" dismissed as nonjusticiable a
federal court judge's claim that the Senate acted unconstitutionally by
impeaching him without conducting a hearing in front of the entire Senate.
Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the most formal conception of
nonjusticiabili, holding that all claims surrounding impeachment were
nonjusticiable. But in a concurrence, Justice Souter contended that at some
outrageous point, the Court could and should review certain Senate
impeachment procedures, such as deciding an impeachment by a flip of a
74. KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 51 (5th ed. rev. 1989).
75. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
76. 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992).
77. 113 S. Ct. 732, 740 (1993).
78. Id. at 734-40.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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coin.79  Justice Souter, in other words, created an escape hatch, an opening
without any content or standard beyond his extreme hypothetical, that future
impeached officials could attempt to exploit.
Justice Souter's escape hatch arguably solves the doctrinal dilemma better
than Chief Justice Rehnquist's completely inflexible, Chadha-like rule. For
Souter, nonjusticiability became a doctrine of hyper-deference, far more
deferential than the very passive "rational purpose test. ,80 The Court should
only review political actions arising under a text generally found to be
nonjusticiable when the political body has exceeded the "outer perimeter" of
its authority. 8 Whether anyone would agree with Justice Souter that coin-
flipping would be justiciable, many would expect the Court to review an
impeachment based upon a confession obtained by torture. To prevent the
use of such vile evidence, the Court probably would rely on another part of
the Constitution, such as the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-
incrimination (just as Due Process probably would most likely be triggered
by Justice Souter's coin-flipping hypothetical), to pierce the normally
successful defense of nonjusticiability in impeachment cases. Justice
Souter's escape hatch demonstrates how a highly deferential scope of review
best reinforces the nonjusticiability doctrine, which has been criticized for
being dangerous, incoherent, or mythical. 82  Under his test, almost all
79. Id. at 748 (Souter, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (rational basis test
used in upholding special interest legislation favoring optometrists and ophthalmologists over
opticians).
81. The Court held that Cabinet officials were immunized from tort suits unless they
exceeded the "outer perimeter" of their authority. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959). The
Court later created virtually absolute presidential immunity from tort damages, but left an "escape
hatch" for plaintiffs to allege that the President exceeded the "outer perimeter" of his authority.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982).. ..
82. The nonjusticiability doctrine remains elusive, requiring the Supreme Court to decide
when it cannot decide a case. Litigants face the peculiar situation of having a case briefed, argued,
and dismissed, giving victory to the defendant, because the Court claims it should not be involved at
all. Professor McCormack described the doctrine as a myth. Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability
Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 599-611, 627-30 (1987). Professor
Henkin doubted its existence. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976). Professor Redish disapproved of judicially unreviewable political power. Martin
H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031 (1984). For
defenses of the doctrine, see James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially
Unenforceable Rules That Combine With Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate Political
Behavior, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 705-16 (1992); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political
Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1988); and Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic
Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643 (1989).
Professor McCormack has modified his views to incorporate the concept of conventions, thereby
creating some scope for the political question doctrine. Wayne McCormack, The Political Question
Doctrine-Jurisprudentially, 70 U. DET. L. REV. 793, 810 (1993).
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impeachment issues will and ought to be finally resolved by Congress.
Admittedly, his doctrine of nonjusticiability would create pockets of political
power beyond meaningful reach of constitutional law. The extremity of
Justice Souter's example-coin flipping-indicates that Congress can easily
satisfy his severely limited scope of judicial review by implementing minimal
procedures. Nevertheless, Justice Souter's tiny, hypothetical compromise
with pure formality better serves the purposes of the doctrine of
nonjusticiability than Chief Justice Rehnquist's rigid formalism, which
apparently validates all impeachments, no matter how they are conducted.
The Supreme Court always needs to be careful in creating constitutional
legal doctrine, which is relatively immutable law created by unelected
officials in a democracy. Aside from everything else, it is difficult to
reverse most of the Court's decisions. Thus, formal constitutional doctrine,
which is designed to bind the future more completely, is more risky than
balancing tests, which can easily be adjusted. Nevertheless, most Americans
want the Court to finalize some constitutional issues, even though they will
disagree over which issues should receive such treatment; they favor
resolution of major issues, even though those settlements will not last
forever. As a result, the Supreme Court will be perpetually torn between
creating rules to enhance predictability and formulating standards to allow
future generations to adapt to unforeseeable problems and to introduce
different perspectives based upon their different experiences. Whether the
Court is deciding to intervene, as in Chadha, or withdraw, as in Nixon, it
will be tempted to leave its successors an opening to deal with the unknown
and the unforeseeable. The escape hatch permits the Court to create
predictable, clear-cut rules that cover virtually all relevant situations without
completely sacrificing flexibility or permitting those protected by the rule to
flagrantly abuse their trust. The far more difficult problem is determining
when to use which form. The Court should not give Congress carte blanche
to terrorize the Executive and Judicial branches through its impeachment
powers but should rigidly require Congress to comply with the Constitution's
rule of recognition to determine what governmental actions carry the
authority of congressional law.
D. Bright Line Peepholes
The Supreme Court rarely makes its doctrine too simple, either in form
or content. We need to return to Florida East Coast to consider another
form of doctrine: bright line peepholes. Florida East Coast's double rule
that requires informal rulemaking unless the enabling statute mandated
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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formal rulemaking with the words, "on the record after an opportunity for an
agency hearing" could have resolved all related issues.8 3 But the decision
has to be read in conjunction with an earlier case, United States v.
84Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp. , in which Justice Rehnquist created a "bright
line peephole" that hedged his formality.85 A "bright line peephole" is a
tiny hypothetical exception that might expand in the future to fulfill the
underlying purposes of the rule (or double rule). Rehnquist stated that the
APA language "on the record" was not talismanic: "We do not suggest that
only the precise words 'on the record' in the applicable statute will suffice to
make [sections] 556 and 557 applicable to rulemaking proceedings . ,86
Formal rulemaking might be necessary even if the enabling statute's text
deviated slightly from the APA's text. Justice Rehnquist provided neither
reasons nor examples to determine the scope or purpose of this conceivable
exception.
Litigants may be able to exploit this opportunity by arguing that a
particular enabling statute's text, which probably would resemble Florida
East Coast's triggering language, evidences congressional intent to require
formal rulemaking. Litigants would probably also need favorable legislative
history. The size of such hypothetical exceptions will be determined over
time. In practice, nobody has prevailed under the Florida East Coast
peephole. After all, the government has the potent counter-argument that
Congress can easily specify formal rulemaking by complying with Florida
East Coast's simple, well-known linguistic requirements. Any other text
indicates that Congress did not intend to require formal rulemaking. Why
would Congress take a chance when an easy, explicit way exists for it to
express its intentions to the Court?8 7 Nevertheless, private parties might be
able to demonstrate clear congressional intent from some minor deviation
from the magic language, such as "on the full record after opportunity for an
agency hearing," text that only adds a more aggressive adjective.
83. 410 U.S. at 234.
84. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
85. Id. at 757.
86. Id.
87. The same reasoning justifies the Supreme Court's frequent use of "clear statements" in
several constitutional areas. For example, the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to
hold that congressional statutes establishing general liability do not apply to states, unless Congress
has included a "clear statement" extending liability to the states. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statements as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593,
611-12 (1992); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 70 (1989).
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Although the prior two cases established the minimal rulemaking
requirements that agencies had to satisfy to comply with the APA, they did
not decide if courts could command additional procedures after the agencies
complied with the APA.. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,88  Justice Rehnquist rejected
environmentalists' procedural challenges to federal nuclear power
regulations that had been promulgated without cross examination or
discovery. 89 Relying on conclusory charts with artificial statistics, those
regulations stated (outrageously) that the disposal of nuclear waste from
nuclear power plants had no adverse environmental consequences. Justice
Rehnquist ruled that the. agency need not provide such procedures, because
section 553 of the APA did not require them in informal rulemaking
proceedings. Thus, the APA created minimal, mandatory procedural
requirements and established the maximum process that Courts could
enforce. 
90
A bitter judicial controversy helped generate the rule. Justice Rehnquist
extrapolated a formal rule from the statutory language of the APA to stop
widespread lower federal court "Monday morning quarterbacking" of
administrative agencies. Led by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, lower federal courts created balancing tests to determine the need
for supplemental procedures. 92
88. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). For criticism, see Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the
Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1819 (1978) ("The . . . best
approach is for courts to provide guidance for administrators and litigants by requiring the use of
hybrid procedures likely in most cases to produce an adequate record for judicial review."). For a
defense, see Clark Byse,. Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrdtive Procedure: A
Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823 (1978). Not yet a member of the federal
judiciary, Antonin Scalia described Vermont Yankee's judicial politics, the struggle between the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit,
and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345. For a general discussion of how the Court
communicates with Congress, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme
Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 27, 66-71, 81-87 (1994).
89. The substantive challenges were remanded. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 525. The
Supreme Court eventually upheld ludicrous charts finding no environmental problems in disposal of
nuclear waste. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S.
87, 103 (1983), rev'g Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
90. The agency could add additional procedures at its own discretion. In Vermont Yankee,
for instance, the Atomic Energy Commission held oral, public hearings, provided access to records,
and developed a transcript. 435 U.S. at 529. Of course, particular enabling statutes or agency
regulations may require additional procedures in either rulemaking or adjudication that agencies
must comply with. The Clean Air Act, for instance, establishes an elaborate process surrounding
rulemaking. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1988).
91. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 547.
92. These APA examples also demonstrate how federal courts can disagree about the
appropriate forms of doctrines in statutory cases as well as constitutional ones.
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Having implied a rigid rule from the statutory text, Justice Rehnquist
nevertheless cryptically noted that a court could mandate additional
procedures to informal rulemaking if there were "extremely compelling
circumstances." 93  Sometimes one need not wait for additional cases to
estimate the size of a peephole; this particular peephole had to be very small,
because Justice Rehnquist refused to apply it to the pending case. Hardly
anything could generate more "extremely compelling circumstances" than
the disposal of radioactive nuclear waste. In other words, the size or form of
a peephole can only be determined by putting it in the context of the case's
facts, competing policies, and underlying substantive laws. Nevertheless,
these peepholes leave slightly more discretion to future courts than escape
hatches.
Overall, Justice Rehnquist chose the appropriate mix of forms of doctrine
to resolve these administrative law issues. He created bright line rules that
will determine virtually all cases. Congress can require formal rulemaking
by including the magic "on the record" language, putting particular
procedures in an enabling statute, or even by amending the APA. But
Justice Rehnquist also created tiny peepholes in both cases that private
litigants might be able to utilize in the future.
94
Carefully tracing the forms of doctrine enables a litigant to determine
possible existing avenues for winning under the existing legal structure.
Initially, the private party seeking more process for rulemaking than
available under section 553 consults the enabling statute to discern if the law
has the preferred "on the record" language requiring formal rulemaking.
Absent this statutory language, the private party has three options: (1)
request Congress to change the language; (2) argue, with little chance of
success, that the relevant text satisfies Florida East Coast, or (3) argue that
93. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543. Justice Rehnquist also noted that plaintiffs might have
a case if agencies abruptly changed their procedures or if the Due Process Clause were triggered
because a few individuals were uniquely affected. He cited Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) (holding that Due Process does not require any procedures
for broad-based, prospective rules).
94. Because doctrine is formed by language and application, it is particularly hard to
determine the size of some openings immediately following a decision. For example, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, created a peephole of indeterminate size by
conditionally supporting Justice Breyer's decision that a state supreme court cannot continue to
apply a statute that the Supreme Court had previously found unconstitutional to claims that accrued
before the Supreme Court's decision. The concurrence stated in part: "We do not read today's
opinion to surrender in advance our authority to decide that in some exceptional cases, courts may
shape relief in light of disruption of important reliance interests or the unfairness caused by
unexpected judicial decision." Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 1752 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The rest of us will have a better idea of the nature and
size of that opening only with the passage of time.
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additional procedures are needed because of "compelling circumstances"
under Vermont Yankee. Creating peepholes is more justifiable here than in
Chadha. The Court is trying to determine congressional purposes. It should
not elevate linguistic formalism above clear manifestation of congressional
intent. Nor are the stakes so high. Congress can eliminate or expand the
Court's rules or peepholes simply by amending the APA or carefully drafting
its enabling statutes.
Escape hatches and peepholes cannot be reduced to either pure bright
lines or balancing tests. They enhance bright lines but also require the Court
to choose between the line or the opening. Furthermore, these small gaps
often use balancing terminology. Justice Rehnquist permitted lower courts to
require additional administrative procedures in Vermont Yankee whenever
there is a "compelling circumstance"-an amorphous standard. He gave no
direction in Florida East Coast for when and why other text might be
sufficient to trigger formal rulemaking.
E. Realized Adverse Exceptions
Using Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in a recent American flag-burning
case, 95 Professor Frederick Schauer supported his hypothesis that exceptions
are the convergence of two rules. 9 6 The Chief Justice would have upheld
convictions of protesters who burn American flags in public to express
contempt for American policies, thereby creating an exception to the general
First Amendment rule proscribing viewpoint discrimination. 97  Schauer
applauded Chief Justice Rehnquist's combination of a general, bright line
rule-no suppression of political speech or conduct for ideological content-
with a narrow, bright line exception-except for the burning or mutilation of
the American flag. According to Schauer, the Chief Justice's solution was a
reasoned resolution of two powerful and traditional themes, free speech and
the hallowed status of the American flag. 98
Professor Schauer's claim triggers several interrelated questions that call
this article's methodology into question. What does the word "rule" mean?
95. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by the Chief
Justice). See generally Kent Greenawalt, O'er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37
UCLA L. REV. 925 (1990); Frank I. Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional
Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (1990).
96. Schauer, Exceptions, supra note 7, at 880-86.
97. The Chief Justice did not directly attack the underlying rule against viewpoint
discrimination or deny the rule's applicability.
98. Schauer, Exceptions, supra note 7, at 885-86.
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Are all hybrids, including escape hatches and peepholes, nothing more than
"exceptions"-a semantic outcome that converts them into Schauer's rules?
If so, there would be no need to create categories like escape hatches,
loopholes, or double rules. 99 Or, at the very least, are exceptions so rule-
like that they should be placed closer to Chadha type rules than escape
hatches, peepholes, or double rules? This article's answers to these
questions of definition, categorization, and ranking demonstrates that
Professor Schauer's proposition illuminates, but ultimately misleads.
Schauer sought to expand the domain of formal rules; he did not seek to
enlarge the definition of "rule" or "exception" to swallow the rule/standard
controversy. Like Justice Scalia, he has strongly advocated formal
doctrine. 10° In other words, Schauer did not make the expansive claim that
exceptions are combinations of any two forms of doctrines, all of which are
"rules." Nevertheless, that argument has to be considered first. All forms of
doctrine are "rules" in the sense that they constitute an element of the "rule
of law" and are judicial commands or instructions. "Unnecessary
roughness" and "delay of game" violations are both football "rules," even
though the interpretation and application of the unnecessary roughness
standard is less definable, more unpredictable, more contextual, and harder
to enforce than the delay of game rule, which is determined by a clock. But
that definition of "rule" is so all-encompassing that it fails to address the
rule/standard controversy.
Nor did Schauer equate his flag-burning example, which contained a
formal rule and a formal exception, with a rule containing a standard as the
exception or with a standard containing a rule as the exception. His
underlying preference for formal rules led him to describe exceptions as
combinations of two formal rules, which is empirically erroneous. This
article has already evaluated several combinations of rules and standards, all
of which seem reasonable. Justice Souter's concurrence in United States v.
Nixon created an escape hatch by example, without providing any reasoning
or criteria. The six prong nonjusticiability test in Baker v. Carr is very
indeterminate. This article will demonstrate that Justice Rehnquist is not
wedded to a narrow set of forms. His peephole standards were purposely
vague in Vermont Yankee and nonexistent in Florida East Coast.
Expanding the scope of doctrinal inquiry into an entire area of law
confirms the limited amount of formal "ruleness" in contemporary legal
doctrine. For example, First Amendment doctrine resembles a legal code, a
99. Cf. POPPER, supra note 74, at 350. Ockham's Razor requires that there be no more
categories than are necessary.
100. See, e.g., Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7.
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prolix morass of rules, standards, factor tests, definitions, loopholes, and
exceptions.101 The Court has protected sexually charged communication but
created exceptions for obscenity (doctrine dominated by vague standards and
delegations of power to local juries via the "community standard"
standard) 10 2 and for child pornography (doctrine that combines a rule-
covering "children" under the age of eighteen-with a vague, diluted Miller-
like standard). 103 Schauer's descriptive error leads to normative error. To
purge all exceptions of standards and to reduce all doctrine to formal rules
would reduce the plasticity that often warrants exceptions in the first place.
Even if Schauer had too formalistic a conception of "exceptions," his
analysis raises another classification challenge. Escape hatches, peepholes,
and double rules can all plausibly be defined as "exceptions," although they
do not always contain two rigid rules, as Schauer claims. Perhaps this
article is overly complicated, because there should be neither more nor less
categories than necessary. But reducing all hybrids to "exceptions" obscures
the following distinctions between types of rules-distinctions that helped
create this article's categorizations: (1) Is the exception hypothetical or
realized?; (2) Does the exception conflict with or support the purposes of the
underlying rule?; (3) How likely is a party to prevail under a given form, or,
in other words, how predictable is the form?; (4) What purposes does the
form fulfill?; and (5) What are the effects of the different forms?
Hypothetical exceptions like escape hatches and peepholes should not be
equated with Chief Justice Rehnquist's flag-burning exceptions, which
signify the triumph of concerns hostile to predominant First Amendment
norms. 10 4  Hypothetical exceptions like escape hatches and peepholes are
judicial genuflections to uncertainty. They theoretically provide the
groundwork for future changes, but in practice they shore up dominant rules
by their very remoteness. However, in the case of realized exceptions, rival
parties know they have a chance in the future, because their side has already
prevailed in the area, either under the rule or the exception. The doctrine is
101. See, e.g., John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizations
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Laurent Frantz, The
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning
of the First Amendnent: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821 (1962); Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); see also
David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate Between Rules
and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (1993).
102. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
103. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755 (1982).
104. See generally AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 38 (1958) (rejecting the
platitude that "the exception proves the rule," "the exception tests the rule, puts it to the proof, not
confirms it").
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at war with itself. Future litigants chafing under the rule may either fit their
facts within the exception or extend the exception's reasoning to cover their
case. Admittedly, adverse exceptions consisting of bright line rules remain
predictable so long as the existing exception is rigidly followed. But
consider the following hypothetical. State officials arrest those who refuse to
stand during the Star Spangled Banner. That song has also been around for
a long time. Should it also be protected like the American flag?
If one believes that the right to express controversial political views is a
"core right" that needs to be protected by a formal rule proscribing
viewpoint discrimination, one becomes wary of any exceptions not just
because of their own significance, but also due to their precedential authority
to generate additional exceptions. After all, it is a platitude that exceptions
can swallow rules.
The need for a separate category of "double rules" should now be more
clear. Florida East Coast's two rules work in tandem to achieve a consistent
goal under the APA, while Chief Justice Rehnquist's flag-burning exception
signaled the triumph of one set of norms over a rival cluster of values. One
can call formal rulemaking an "exception" to the rule favoring informal
rulemaking, but that type of exception is not as destabilizing as an adverse
exception. Florida East Coast's double rule makes the entire APA more
coherent and determinate, while Chief Justice Rehnquist's American flag-
burning exception would have made important First Amendment doctrine
more indeterminate.
Lawyers need to predict the size, purpose, direction, and durability of
exceptions. Creating a narrow, clear-cut flag-burning exception generates
more legal volatility than acknowledging, without elaborate reasoning,
potential, remote exceptions via "escape hatches" or "peepholes." Perhaps
some readers do not like these particular metaphors, just as some do not like
the Supreme Court's three level Equal Protection doctrine of "strict
scrutiny," "intermediate scrutiny," and "rational purpose." However, such
metaphors help litigants determine their odds of winning. Parties are not
likely to get around bright line rules, double rules, or use escape hatches.
Their odds slightly improve with peepholes. But both sides will be far less
certain about cases containing realized adverse exceptions, because both
sides will have already won prior cases and will have competing facts, law,
and reasons to rely on. Adverse exceptions provide clear-cut opportunities
to avoid the underlying rule and the purposes that the rule serves.
105. So long as they are not taken too seriously, numerical odds provide a crude metaphor to
capture the distinctions between these forms. Escape hatches, designed to empower the rule instead
of undermining it, are likely to open once in a thousand cases. Peepholes might be successfully
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These technical problems of categorization should not dissuade the reader
from accepting the article's main thesis that there are many forms of doctrine
combining aspects of rules and standards. Even if the article has erred in
naming, dividing, or ranking the forms, such mistakes do not in themselves
refute the article's propositions that many forms exist; those forms ought to
exist; and the rule/standard debate has often degenerated into a false and
misleading dichotomy.
F. Extensions
Exceptions shrink pre-existing rules, while extensions expand them. 10
6
Courts often will reconsider even the most rigid rules, because potential
beneficiaries of those rules will attempt to extend those rules' scope, while
potential losers will seek to distinguish or limit their influence. 107 For
instance, the Court relied on LN.S. v. Chadha to hold in a per curiam
decision that congressional compliance with the Bicameralism Clause did not
cure noncompliance with the Presentment Clause; Congress had still passed
an unconstitutional legislative veto. 1°8  The Court eliminated a residual
ambiguity not precisely covered by the particular facts of Chadha-Congress
must comply with both clauses to satisfy the Constitution's rule of
recognition.
0 9
H.L.A. Hart's famous example of interpreting prohibitions against
vehicles in parks110 reminds us of the difficult questions of rule application.
The Supreme Court probably will not extend Chadha to proscribe
administrative regulations or executive orders, even though those two types
of federal law fail to comply with bicameralism. Such formalism would gut
the administrative system of needed flexibility, power, and speed.
used one percent of the time. Realized exceptions always provide opportunities in terms of
application or expansion to get around the predominant rule. Of course, the exception may be very
small and rigid. After all, the American flag is arguably a unique symbol generating a unique
exception to a general rule. Nevertheless, a realized exception is a greater crack in a rule than a
hypothetical escape hatch or peephole.
106. Exceptions can swallow rules, while extensions can expand preexisting rules beyond
recognition.
107. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 46.
108. Process Gas Consumers Corp. v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216
(1983), aff'g Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
109. Consumer Energy Council, 673 F.2d at 448.
110. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593,
607-08 (1958). Professor Fuller provided an almost equally famous rebuttal in Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). For a
constitutional application of the vehicle in the park problem, see Steven L. Winter, An
Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
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Furthermore, Congress can trump those laws with legislation. Greater
formality is needed to regulate and determine the exercise of greater power.
But nobody can confidently predict how the Court will evaluate legislative
vetoes created pursuant to the congressional power to declare war, which
arguably is not "legislative" action, but rather is a constitutional grant of
"executive" power to the legislative branch."'
The Court extended Chadha in Bowsher v. Synar112 by holding that
congressional placements of congressional members or agents in executive
positions were the functional equivalents of legislative vetoes. The Court
combined Buckley v. Valeo's 113 ban on congressional personnel being placed
within the executive branch with Chadha's ban on legislative vetoes to create
another vivid bright line. In Buckley, Congress had created a statute that
permitted them to appoint congressional members to supervise election
reform. The Court could have distinguished Chadha and Buckley in Bowsher
on the ground that the Solicitor General was an agent of Congress, not a
member of Congress. Issues of agency invariably complicate litigation,
providing potential distinctions even in constitutional cases. For instance,
the Court previously held that police officials were not responsible for
unconstitutional actions of police officers in Rizzo v. Goode. Nor were
states responsible for school segregation caused by their municipalities in
Milliken v. Bradley." 5
By combining Buckley and Chadha, the Court reinforced both formal
rules. Those two rules prevent Congress from invading the executive
branch, either directly through a veto or indirectly through individual
congressional members or congressional agents. Thus, there is some merit
in criticizing Chief Justice Burger's crude characterization of all legislative
vetoes in Chadha as "legislative." An element of "executive" action also
existed when the House of Representatives refused to permit Chadha to
remain in the United States. But that element constituted another violation of
separation of powers principles. The need for a clear rule of recognition,
combined with the desirability of keeping the personnel of all three branches
separate from each other as much as possible, supports the Court's
111. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
112. 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986); cf. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 269 (1991) (Congress cannot place its members as
citizen-users on board overseeing Washington airports).
113. 424 U.S. 1, 124-37 (1976).
114. 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976).
115. 418 U.S. 717, 748-49 (1974). See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE (1991) (arguing that the liberal Warren Court's agenda failed).
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formalistic outcomes in these cases. 116  Thus, another legitimate goal-
segregating the three federal branches' personnel-adds additional force to
Chadha's rigid conclusion.
G. Factor Tests
Forms of doctrine can help determine which facts litigants need to prove
in subsequent cases. 117 After Chadha and its progeny, for example, a
plaintiff need only show that Congress placed one of its members or agents
in an executive position or passed a legislative veto to prove a violation of
the bicameralism or presentment requirements or both. Factor tests
explicitly limit relevancy, thereby partially constraining future judicial
discretion and making the law more predictable. But factor tests are not as
predictable as bright lines, because they require courts to continue to balance
the various factors, which may be incommensurable.
Mathews v. Eldridge" is the most influential factor test in contemporary
constitutional law. Justice Powell refused to grant a formal pre-termination
hearing to a Social Security disability recipient whose benefits had been
terminated. Justice Powell created a three prong cost-benefit test to
determine the amount of process "due" a particular claimant under the Due
Process Clauses. Courts must only consider: (1) the plaintiff's interest, (2)
the amount of increased accuracy the additional procedures requested by the
plaintiff will add to the existing process, and (3) the cost of those additional
procedures. 119  Applying those factors, Justice Powell concluded that the
plaintiff was not entitled to a formal pre-termination hearing, unlike welfare
recipients who had received elaborate procedural protections in Goldberg v.
Kelly. 12
0
First, the Social Security disability plaintiffs need for the procedures was
not likely to be as great, because welfare recipients relied on their benefits to
live while Social Security disability recipients were more financially
secure. 12 1  Second, existing informal Social Security pre-termination
116. See James G. Wilson, Altered States: A Comparison of Separation of Powers in the
United States and in the United Kingdom, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 125, 165-75 (1990).
117. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 318. Posner described one cost of choosing personal
justice, which looks at each case's particulars, over formal rules: "By greatly expanding the
boundaries of the relevant, personal justice makes the process of decision enormously cumbersome
and legal obligations unpredictable." Id.
118. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
119. Id. at 335.
120. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
121. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 342.
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procedures were adequate. 122  Because the doctors played a major role in
determining physical or mental disability, the Court found the issue of
disability was more "objective," based on more reliable medical proof.123 In
contrast, the typical welfare determination is less "sharply focused, " 124 and
centers on such disputes as having "men in the house" or failing to report
income. Justice Powell also noted the increased costs of formal pre-
termination hearings. 
125
Professor Mashaw criticized Eldridge for failing to include, as an
additional factor, the dignitary value that hearings provide to recipients,
whether they win or lose. 26 Perhaps dignitary benefits were folded into the
first factor, the "plaintiffs interest." But the Eldridge Court did not appear
to care about the plaintiffs feelings. Overall, the Eldridge factor test not
only curbed future judicial discretion as to which facts and emotions to
consider, but it also favored the government. As importantly, Justice Powell
explicitly made governmental expenses constitutionally relevant in his third
prong, thereby rejecting rhetoric flourishing among lower federal courts that
no price could be put on constitutional rights. 1
27
The degree of predictability, which has been this article's baseline,
requires an additional distinction between "objective" and "subjective"
factors.128 Proof of "objective" factors exists outside the courtroom, while
"subjective" factors are the judge's viewpoints. "Objective" factors are
slightly more predictable because litigants can determine what evidence
122. Id. at 343.
123. Id. at 344.
124. Id. at 343.
125. Id. at 347.
126. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge. Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28, 49-52 (1976).
127. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 347. Justice Powell also did not adopt the view in Goldberg that
the government had a major interest in making sure that eligible recipients should continue to
receive their benefits. 397 U.S. at 264. For Justice Powell, all the governmental interests existed
on one side of the scales.
The relationship between forms of doctrines and evidentiary relevance could lead to the
erroneous conclusion that forms of doctrines are merely rules of evidence. Although everything
may eventually converge in jurisprudence, it is helpful to separate the forms of doctrine from the
technical rules of evidence, just as it is useful to categorize the forms themselves. The rules of
evidence exist within the courtroom, as tools that determine how parties prove facts to satisfy a
particular form's substantive requirements. The rules of evidence do not, in themselves, yield
particular substantive outcomes. In addition, the rules of evidence contain forms of doctrine. A
conclusive presumption, for instance, is a bright line rule. Consequently, the rules of evidence are
means that serve forms of doctrine, just as different forms of doctrine are means that advance
substantive ends, such as predictability.
128. The Court must engage in a meta-subjective balancing test to determine which factors,
objective and subjective, to include in its final formulation of doctrine.
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matters. Objective factor tests also somewhat limit judicial discretion
because judges must explain how they derived their conclusions from the
verifiable facts. In Eldridge, for example, the cost factor is relatively
objective. Parties can fairly accurately determine the costs of existing
procedural systems. Although it will be more difficult, litigants can estimate
additional costs of the plaintiff's alternative procedures.
Yet, it is hard to predict how much more accuracy additional procedures
will give to an adjudication. One problem is knowing when the legal-
administrative system gets a decision "right." One cannot easily prove that
different processes would yield different outcomes when a case is only tried
once under one set of procedures; there cannot be any "double blind" test of
each process. Nevertheless, parties have developed somewhat artificial
techniques to reveal the accuracy of different procedural structures. For
example, in Eldridge, the plaintiffs pointed out that administrative law judges
reversed over fifty percent of appealed Social Security disability termination129
cases.
The plaintiff's interest, however, requires the most subjective judicial
determination. Justice Powell arguably blundered in Eldridge by
distinguishing all Social Security disability cases from welfare cases.
Supplemental Social Security Income disability recipients frequently had no
other possible source of income; many states did not assist individuals
without families or provide a minimal amount of general assistance.
130
Furthermore, disability recipients could have been worse off than many
welfare recipients because of their inability to work.
The Court subsequently demonstrated the subjectivity of determining the
"plaintiff's interest" when it decided that a horse trainer accused of
improperly drugging one of his horses had a right to a formal pre-
termination hearing. It is unclear why a horse trainer's interests were
greater than a Social Security recipient's need for minimal income.'
32
Nevertheless, even the third test requires the Court to explain the plaintiffs
129. 424 U.S. at 346.
130. In 1993, Governor Engel of Michigan abolished general assistance for 83,000 recipients.
Off the Rolls and Into What?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1993, at 32.
131. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979).
132. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that states could not execute
convicted rapists). The Court applied a two prong test that expressly applied a subjective and an
objective test to determine if a penalty was so "disproportionate" that is violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 592. The Court first had to decide if
the penalty was "excessive." Id. Few things are less predictable than any person's rankings of
penalties and crimes. The Court also would count statutes and jury verdicts under its "objective"
test. Id. We thus can predict what will be relevant, but we still cannot predict what weight will be
given to that "objective" law.
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interests, enabling critics to point out such errors as underestimating the
amount of injury to terminated Social Security disability recipients. 133
The "objectivity" of objective factor tests should not be exaggerated.
Judges subjectively decide which objective and subjective factors count in
interpreting the "objective" data. For example, the Court has frequently
surveyed State laws for "objective" information about societal norms.' 34 In
Powell v. Alabama, the Court held that defendants facing the death penalty
had a right to a lawyer without charge even though no states provided paid
counsel at the time. 1 35 In Coker v. Georgia, Justice White held that the fact
that only four states authorized the death penalty for rape was "objective"
proof that the penalty was disproportionate. 36 Finally, the Court held that
parents had no right to a paid lawyer in termination ofparental rights cases
even though thirty-three States provided such a service.
H. Definitions
Definitions differ from factor tests more in form than function, because
they also establish a limited set of criteria that litigants must satisfy.138 For
example, in the First Amendment case Brandenburg v. Ohio, 139 the Supreme
Court defined unprotected "incitement" as: "such advocacy [of the use of
force or of law violation] that is directed to inciting or producing imminent
133. The Supreme Court does not always give equal weight to its factors. For example, the
Court created a six-factor test to determine the applicability of Eleventh Amendment immunity in
Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-02 (1979).
Although those "indicators of immunity point[ed] in different directions" in Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., the Supreme Court did not grant immunity. 115 S. Ct. 394, 404 (1994). It
approvingly cited court of appeals determinations that "the vulnerability of the State's purse [is] the
most salient factor." Id. The Court also apparently created a per se rule precluding immunity to
entities formed via interstate compacts. Id. at 406.
Narrowing the focus does not necessarily generate a rule. In the course of finding that a
congressional statute did not preempt common law tort actions, the Court observed: "At best,
Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption;
it does not establish a rule." Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1995) (referring
to Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992)).
134. Justice Scalia calls this quest "tradition."
135. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
136. 433 U.S. at 593.
137. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981).
138. Professor Gelman recently formulated a seven-factor test with a rigid, five-part definition
to protect what he believes is a fundamental constitutional right not to be biologically altered by the
government. Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1203,
1215-16, 1284 (1995). As applied by Gelman, this doctrine will almost always trump the
government.
139. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 140 Under this
definition, a prosecutor must prove and need only prove (1) advocacy (2) of
the use of force or of law violation, (3) the intention to incite or produce
unlawful action, (4) the imminence of the unlawful act, and (5) the likelihood
that such action will be produced. The Court concluded that the defendant, a
leader of the Ku Klux Klan, should not have been convicted of incitement,
because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the difference between
"mere advocacy" and "incitement to imminent lawless action. 14' As with
factor tests, some parts of the definition force litigants to develop facts, while
other parts primarily appeal to the trier of fact's judgment. Under
Brandenburg, prosecutors will have the easiest time proving advocacy of the
use of force or law violation, more difficulty with mens rea, and either an
easier or harder time proving imminence and likelihood, depending on
whether or not force or lawlessness eventually occurred.
Definitions are somewhat different than factor tests, because factor tests
contain separate variables that must first be considered separately and then
balanced against each other. Under Eldridge, for instance, a court must
compare the plaintiff's interest and the plaintiff's predictions of improved
accuracy caused by requiring additional procedures against predicted
increased costs. But Brandenburg requires the prosecutor to prove all of the
definition's elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the
Brandenburg definition also is a simultaneous equation. Courts will and
should consider how the different parts of the definition interact in light of
the particular facts of the case. The jury or judge will be more likely to find
bad intent, imminence, and likely harm when reviewing a serious proposal to
destroy a nuclear power plant than a plea to participate in a college sit-in. 142
Brandenburg's fluid definition balanced the often conflicting ends of free
speech and social peace. 143  Society (including the judiciary) should not
tolerate violence nor anarchical lawlessness, yet governmental critics ought
to be able to express themselves freely and fiercely. Unconditional
protection of political speech would eliminate all crimes of conspiracy, while
140. Id. at 447.
141. Id. at 448.
142. Judge Learned Hand created a formula to express the trade-off: "In each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d
Cir. 1950). Judge Hand's formula was cited favorably in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
510 (1951) (upholding facial challenge to statute permitting conviction of Communist Party leaders);
see also William Van Alystyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV.
107, 124 (1982) (providing a graph describing Hand's analysis).
143. Of course, civil libertarians believe that an expanded definition of free speech increases
the likelihood of social peace.
804 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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defining "incitement" as advocating lawlessness without any immediacy
element could criminalize all discussions about civil disobedience, jokes,
crank proposals, and classroom hypotheticals. Potential defendants need to
know as precisely as possible what combination of events will make them
liable for criminal prosecution. Furthermore, due process precludes
prosecutors from picking and choosing among elements. Finally, the
Supreme Court's technique of separating out certain categories of speech as
being unprotected or deserving less than full First Amendment protection
seems best advanced by definitions that will place clusters of words within
those categories. Perhaps the only way to make "child pornography" an
unprotected form of speech is to define "child pornography." 144
L Pure Balancing Tests
Just as all forms of doctrine can be characterized as "rules," they also can
be defined as "balancing tests." First, courts must engage in a meta-
balancing test to choose the appropriate form, considering different forms'
strengths and weaknesses. 145 For instance, the Supreme Court balanced the
costs and benefits of regulating child pornography before creating a bright-
line rule that all filmed or photographed child pornography could be
outlawed. 146  Because such pornography was so vile, harmful to children,
and socially worthless, the Court concluded there was no need for case-by-
case determinations. 147  Second, every form includes traces of balancing.
Even the most rigid bright line rule contains a possible equity exception or
remains vulnerable to being overruled or modified. But labeling all forms
"balancing tests" is as excessive as describing all forms as "rules." Both
definitions are so global that they approach triviality. Neither definition
enables courts to decide which form or forms are appropriate in a particular
case. Nor does either definition help resolve the rule/standard dispute.
The typical doctrinal balancing test requires the court to weigh two
competing clusters of facts and norms.14  For example, the rigorous
144. See Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825 (1962) (explaining the need for definitions in First Amendment
doctrine).
145. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the Court balances individual freedom against
majority rule in constitutional cases. WILLIAM A. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT-HoW IT
WAS, How IT Is 318-19 (1987).
146. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57, 759-60 (1982).
147. Id. at 763-64.
148. Balancing tests can tip dramatically with one change in the facts. In the course of
deciding that Congress could not prohibit all government employees from being compensated for
speech outside their employment, the Court distinguished a prior holding limiting the First
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balancing test called "strict scrutiny" compares "fundamental rights" with
"compelling state interests." 149 Although such conclusory rhetoric supports
the allegation that balancing tests are ad hoc, it is not so easy to place such
balancing tests on the predictability continuum. One cannot tell how rule-
like these tests are simply by examining their language. The common law
"reasonable man" tort standard is designed to be indeterminate and
evolutionary, while the "rational purpose" test in constitutional law virtually
guarantees a victory for the government.
1. The Rational Purpose Balancing Test
As applied by the Supreme Court, the rational purpose test generates
about as bright a line as one will find in constitutional law,150 even though it
putatively weighs the plaintiffs interests against the government's interests
and means. These examples reconfirm the error of castigating all balancing
tests or all bright line rules. Balancing tests of varying degrees of
predictability pervade constitutional law, reflecting the high stakes caused by
the perpetual, underlying tension between freedom and authority. Once one
concedes that particular constitutional text protects some rights but does not
completely preclude governmental regulation, balancing has begun. The
alternative is to believe in absolute rights and absolute powers. Even if
rights are trumps, it is not clear who has, much less who should have the ace
of trumps.
The line generated by the rational purpose test is not perfectly bright.
The Supreme Court decided that a city "irrationally" discriminated against
the mentally retarded in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,' 1 and
Amendment rights of government employees in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968): "[Wle established that the Government must be able to satisfy a balancing test of the
Pickering form to maintain a statutory restriction on employee speech . ..we did not determine
how the components of the Pickering balance should be analyzed in the context of a sweeping
statutory impediment to speech." United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct.
1003, 1013 (1995).
149. In 1993, the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting the distribution of campaign
material within 100 feet of a polling booth even though that statute had to be strictly scrutinized
under three different doctrines designed to protect the fundamental right of free speech: the statute
was content-based; it regulated the sidewalks, a public forum; and it discriminated against political
speech, the most favored category. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992). In other
words, the level of scrutiny frames the issue but does not decide any particular case.
150. Many doctrines that superficially look like balancing tests operate like formal rules.
Professor Sullivan observed that strict scrutiny is rule-like. Kathleen Sullivan, Governmental
Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions Law: A Case Study in Categorization and Balancing, 55
ALB. L. REV. 605, 606 (1992). On the other hand, intermediate scrutiny is real balancing. Id.
151. 473 U.S. 432, 433 (1985).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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held that Congress "irrationally" denied food stamps to communes in
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.152  Such variations prove that the
rational purpose test is not as formal as the rule in Chadha. But the test is
clearly more rule-like, more predictable than the Craig v. Boren'
53
intermediate scrutiny test in gender discrimination cases. Both in theory and
in practice, it is impossible to know when five Justices will find that the
government has proven that a gender-based classification is "substantially
related" to achievement of "important governmental objectives." 1 54  Only
young women will be protected by statutory rape laws,' 55 but young men
will have the same rights as young women to drink liquor. 1
56
Are deviations from the general application of the usually rigid rational
purpose rule nothing more than exceptions? Once again, the indiscriminate
use of the word "exception" distorts more than it reveals. Explicit
exceptions to rules should not be equated with differing applications of rules,
as in Cleburne. Realized adverse exceptions arise when the Court concludes
that competing considerations trumped the purposes of the underlying rule:
burning the American flag would not be protected by the otherwise valid,
applicable rule proscribing viewpoint discrimination. When the Court
applies the rational purpose rule, it upholds all statutes that have "rational
purposes" and invalidates all those that do not. A rule does not lose its
ruleness because it does not resolve every related outcome in one direction.
The alternative-describing the Court's protection of the mentally retarded in
Cleburne as an exception to the rational purpose test-is like describing a
doctor's victory in a medical malpractice suit as an exception to the
negligence rule.
2. Formulating Rules With the "Tools of Doctrine"
One problem with emphasizing one level of legal abstraction is that other
important judicial techniques may be ignored or insufficiently integrated into
the analysis. Judicial craft extends far beyond the choice of a form of
doctrine.157 The actual scope of judicial review is also found in the Court's
152. 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973). The Supreme Court undermined Moreno in Lyng v.
International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 371 (1988), which upheld a congressional ban on food
stamps to striking workers.
153. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
154. Id. at 197.
155. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1981).
156. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-02.
157. Perhaps because they have read study aids such as GILBERT'S too much, some law
students blunder by stopping their legal analysis too soon. They apparently believe they have
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"tools of doctrine," devices it has created to separate the constitutional from
the unconstitutional. This article will temporarily shift levels of abstraction
to demonstrate how the forms of doctrine and the tools of doctrine work
together. Lawyers can only predict how rule-like a rule will actually be after
studying the Court's choice of forms and'tools. 1
5 8
In McCulloch v. Maryland,159 the Court upheld a decision favoring a
National Bank and prohibited states from taxing that Bank's operations.
Chief Justice Marshall set forth a famous test that focused on unconstitutional
ends, unconstitutional means, and poor fits between constitutional ends and
means:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 160
Under this approach, the Court first intensifies its scope of review by
being more critical of asserted governmental purposes, of alleged "ends." In
Shapiro v. Thompson, for instance, the Court said Colorado could not
preclude new residents from receiving welfare benefits, because it was an
unconstitutional goal to deter potential recipients from living there. 16 1 In
Regents of the University of Califomia v. Bakke, 162 Justice Powell held that
state universities could not implement affirmative action plans to remedy
"societal discrimination. " 163  Further, the Court will not tolerate certain
means, such as torture, in any situation. Powell's Bakke opinion proscribed
the use of strict racial quotas.'6
But McCulloch also requires the Court to ferret out "pretexts " 65-
situations where the government claims it is fulfilling a constitutional
completed their job after citing appropriate text, cases, levels of scrutiny, and incantations like
"compelling state interest."
158. Sometimes the Court includes some of these tools within its formal doctrine. In Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 US. 557 (1980), the Court held that if the
regulated commercial speech is lawful and not misleading and if the alleged governmental interest is
substantial, then the Court must determine if "the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest," Id. at
566. Close analysis of the record, subtle shifts in burdens of proof, choice of alternatives, and
claims of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness are the tools that determine that fit. For
additional discussion of Central Hudson, see the Step Test section, infra notes 175-85.
159. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
160. Id. at 421.
161. 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
162. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
163. Id. at 310.
164. Id. at 289.
165. 17 U.S. at 423.
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purpose, but is actually acting unconstitutionally. The Court must not
automatically accept the government's alleged purposes. For example, the
Court rejected the City of Hialeah's claim that its ban on religious animal
sacrifices was passed to prevent cruelty to animals; the Court believed the
City passed the ordinance to punish a single religious sect. 166
The Court has created several devices, several "tools of doctrine," to
evaluate the "fit" between ends and means. "Poor fits" indicate
unconstitutional motives and purposes or reveal violations of McCulloch's
requirement that means be "plainly adapted to [the] end. " 167 The Court
considers whether the State could have used less constitutionally provocative
alternatives. In Shapiro, the Court claimed that the state could prevent
fraud, a legitimate end, without prohibiting all new residents from receiving
welfare. Instead, the state could supervise claimants more closely and
prosecute violators. 68 In addition, the Court can determine if the challenged
statute is "underinclusive" or "overinclusive." Does the statute not cover
people it should or does it affect those it should not? For instance, a state
could not preclude an adult living in his parents' home from voting in a
school district election because the ban precludes the plaintiff, who is
interested in school issues, but permits an uninterested renter to
participate. 169 The Court also closely scrutinizes the record, second-guessing
facts and beliefs. The Cleburne plurality protected the mentally retarded
because "negative attitude[s]" toward them constituted an "irrational
prejudice. "170
Another way to constrain future judicial choices is to skew the burden of
proof. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, the Court held that the only way a
school district could rebut a segregation claim after a finding of segregative
intent in one part of the system was to prove "that the [segregated area] is a
separate, identifiable, and unrelated section of the school district."1 71 The
defendant school district must also show that "other segregated schools
within the system are not also the result of intentional segregative
actions. ', 172 Such burdens of proof create virtual bright line rules. No
school district can demonstrate that one of its parts is "unrelated" to the rest,
much less prove the negative that its other segregated schools were not the
result of intentional segregative actions. Everybody knows that segregative
166. Church of the Lukumi Babuli Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993).
167. 17 U.S. at 421.
168. 394 U.S. at 637 & n.18.
169. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.15 (1969).
170. 473 U.S. at 450.
171. 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973).
172. Id. at 208.
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intent can occur without any express statements in the record. To
summarize, one cannot be sure how rule-like a holding is by simply studying
the holding or the form of doctrine; one has to analyze the many other ways
courts can stack the odds.
J. Step Tests
Sometimes the Court establishes a series of doctrinal hurdles. Over the
past two decades, Justices from a broad range of political perspectives have
interpreted the First Amendment to protect commercial speech. One can
defend such judicial activism on the ground that the information contained in
commercial speech can be very valuable to consumer and producer alike. In
addition, commercial speech always has a "political" element. Even when
advertisements are not draped in the American flag or do not soar with a
bald eagle, they send implicit messages defending capitalism and corporatism
as well as presenting the redemptive power of individualistic consumerism.
Many ads are politically explicit, extolling their creators' environmentalism,
views on health policy, or compassion. Not only are television ads often the
best produced parts of many shows, but they also contain more effective
ideological messages than more expressly political programs. But as Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed in his early dissents, providing constitutional
protection for the market system triggers uncomfortable memories of
Lochner v. New York,173 in which the Supreme Court construed due process
to preclude states from regulating the hours that bakers worked even though
a study indicated that many were dying prematurely from overwork.
Furthermore, some products, such as cigarettes, firearms, and alcohol, are
legal, but nonetheless harmful.
The Court's solution in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission175 has been to create an elaborate, four-step,
intermediate scrutiny test, a test that always gives vast discretionary power to
future Justices:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
173. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
174. Id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 70 (quoting Professor Hirt's Diseases
of the Workers).
175. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
1 76
The Justices must first determine if the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. Obscene commercials, for example, could be prohibited
because the Court is unwilling to defend any form of obscenity. 177  Even
regular commercial speech is protected only when it concerns "lawful
activity" and is not "misleading.,178 Although the Court can easily determine
if a product or service is lawful by consulting the positive law, it will have
more difficulty applying the "misleading" standard. Do excessive numbers
of children's ads mislead? Assuming that this first step, which focuses on
the regulated speech, has been satisfied, the Court next determines if the
governmental interest is "substantial"1 79-the favorite judicial adjective in
intermediate scrutiny tests. Needless to say, "substantial" is a vague
standard, traditionally used by the Court in a very unpredictable way. The
government will always claim it is regulating a substantial harm, but it is
impossible to predict how much deference the Court will give to legislative
findings of harm under the First Amendment.'
180
The Court then pauses to determine if each of these two stages have been
answered positively. 181 Assuming that the ads cover lawful material in a
nondeceptive fashion and that the government has a substantial interest, the
Court next determines if the "regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted. ,i82 The use of the adverb "directly" might suggest that this
step is onerous, but the government will always have a prima facie case that
reducing or regulating the advertisements will reduce the demand for the
harmful activity, the alleged governmental interest that provoked the
regulation in the first place. The fourth step provides the tougher part of this
ends-means inquiry; the Court must determine if the regulation is "not more
176. Id. at 566.
177. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
178. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
179. Id.
180. The Court was willing to accept legislative findings of harm for child pornography far
more easily than it was congressional concerns that cable television would dominate and even
destroy free broadcast television. Compare New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982) with
Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2450 (1994).
181. Step tests force judges and litigants to separate and sequence their claims. In Purkett v.
Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995), the Supreme Court criticized a court of appeals for combining
steps 2 and 3 of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986), a three-step test to determine
improper use of peremptory challenges striking potential jurors.
182. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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extensive than necessary to serve that interest." 183 Although this standard
could be read to require a tight fit between ends and means, like the "least
restrictive alternative" requirement, the Court has in practice been
increasin~ly deferential to governmental regulations of commercial
speech, particularly when "vice" is involved.' Overall, the Court
created an elaborate dance pattern under which it must separately answer
such questions-questions that vary in form and burden of proof.
Nevertheless, the steps flow together, somewhat resembling factor tests and
definitions. When the governmental interest is very substantial in preventing
a severe, foreseeable harm-regulating the sale and use of firearms, for
example-the Court will be more deferential throughout its analysis. The
advantage of the step test is that the Court can sometimes stop its inquiry
before wrestling with fits between legislative ends and means. If the speech
is not protected or the governmental interest is not substantial, the case is
over.
K. Competing Considerations Test
Many of Justice Harlan's opinions retain their vitality because of their
nuanced, candid decision-making. Dissenting in Shapiro v. Thompson,
Justice Harlan applied a variant of balancing tests-the "competing
considerations" inquiry-in which he strongly expressed both sides'
arguments. 186 Although he considered potent arguments for both sides, he
ultimately concluded, without much discussion, that states did not have to
pay welfare to new residents.
1 87
Some may find this approach vacuous and semantically indistinguishable
from balancing tests. Nevertheless, Justice Harlan's approach lets all parties
know that their arguments have been evaluated. Courts often didactically
and confidently use jargon to make their decisions appear inevitable. They
define a plaintiffs interest as a "fundamental right" or not, briskly evaluate
alternatives to see if they are "too restrictive," and dismiss governmental
purposes that are not "compelling." Tensions within cases fade behind
doctrinal forms and tools. Such slaughters belie how close many cases are,
reflecting the regrettable tendency of many American judges to make their
183. Id.
184. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring only a "reasonable"
fit between ends and means).
185. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993) (permitting state
banning of radio lottery ads).
186. 394 U.S. 618, 663 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 677.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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opinions appear impregnable by attempting to repudiate completely the
losing side.
Admiration for Harlan's straightforward presentation of the partial
validity of both sides' positions does not last long. His approach brings forth
an anxiety lurking underneath all the forms of doctrine. Even after a judge
chooses a form, how should the judge apply that form? What makes a judge
reach the final conclusion, both as to form and application of that form?
Justice Harlan did not seriously explain why he chose the government's
cluster of positions over the claims of welfare recipients. His candor
revealed a huge chasm at the heart of legal reasoning, a void at the very
moment that additional reasons seem most necessary. Talk about
indeterminacy! 
1 88
The problem may be partially solved and partially aggravated by
considering our legal culture's complex understanding of the concept of
"reason." Many American lawyers and judges are on a quest for "right
reason," which contains such inspiring traits as Objectivity and Truth.
Others take a purely instrumental view, reducing "reason" to optimal fitting
of means to ends.18 9  The philosopher Karl Popper offered another
definition. Scientists can never be certain they know the truth; everything is
opinion, conjecture. 190 But Popper's inability to find essence or knowledge
of truth did not drive him into existential despair or pure relativism. He
argued that humans will seek and even approach truth by using the critical
scientific method, a procedural form of "reason" that tests conjectures with
facts, even though humans can never be certain that they have found the
truth. 19 1  Although there are many differences between the scientific and
legal methods, particularly in terms of verification, Popper's notion of
"reason" resembles Justice Harlan's Shapiro dissent.1 92  Justice Harlan
considered all arguments without pretending that solutions were easy or cost-
free. Harlan's form described his decision-making process: acknowledge all
188. Requiring reasons for reason's sake eventually resembles the "Why" game played by
young children. One has to stop somewhere, often with intimations of force. In addition, there is
an unexplained, perhaps unexplainable leap between different reasons, norms, and principles and
their applications. All the Supreme Court Justices would claim that their opinions prevent tyranny,
a noble end, but could not prove that the particular outcome of most of their cases can be derived
from or will serve that general purpose.
189. POSNER, supra note 12, at 105-08.
190. Karl Popper explained that science is ultimately based on a form of adversarial process:
"The rationalist tradition, the tradition of critical discussion, represents the only practicable way of
expanding our knowledge-conjectural or hypothetical knowledge, of course." POPPER, supra note
74, at 151.
191. Id.
192. See 394 U.S. at 655-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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colorable arguments and make a choice, even if one cannot prove the
validity of the ultimate decision.
Popper's methodology also demonstrates the limits of process-based
reason. There is no logical, scientific, or objective way to proceed from
listing considerations to ranking them. Perhaps Justice Harlan could have
provided additional "reasons" to explain his final decision. But a leap
remained in his method, a leap from evaluation and presentation to
resolution, that may be impossible to explain fully. Judges are always
comparing incommensurables, weighing such competing interests like fiscal
responsibility and starvation. Even if one disagrees with Justice Harlan in
outcome or form, one has to acknowledge the honest doubts that pervade the
opinion. At the least, the form requires a judge to list all the arguments that
he or she considered. That very process informs future litigants and parties
as to what types of arguments are worthwhile and serves as a limited
constraint of the judge. It is Popper's process-based "reason."
It is probably unwise to ask for too much more. Over two thousand years
ago, Aristotle distinguished formal logic from legal-political analysis. When
advocates attempt to persuade others to take a certain political direction, they
use "enthymemes," not logical syllogisms. 193  Aristotle explained that the
methodology of enthymemes resembles logic only in form. 194 The advocate
derives premises from prevailing public opinions, not from rigid linguistic
conventions or geometrical assumptions. The advocate then attempts to
predict the consequences of different proposed solutions. 195 Assuming that
all legal arguments and judicial opinions are enthymemes, the choice of form
of doctrine is an important component of a successful judicial enthymeme.
Justice Harlan's competing considerations test offers the virtues and vices of
candor, replicating a judge's mulling over competing concerns and
eventually reaching a final resolution without fully explaining why. One
should not be surprised that Justice Harlan's tentative, candid approach has
193. ARISTOTLE, 1 RHETORIC, reprinted in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2153
(Jonathan Barnes ed. & J.O. Urmson revised trans., 1984).
194. Id. at 2153-56; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986)
(distinguishing between the formalistic use of deductive logic and realism's use of policy analysis).
195. "The deliberative orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a
proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good;
if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as
to whether the proposal be just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary
and relative to this main consideration." ARISTOTLE, supra note 193, at 2160. Thus Justice
Holmes' famous epigram, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience," has an
ancient pedigree. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark Deburke Hare ed.,
1963) (1881).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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not been emulated in a society that puts a premium on the appearance of
correctness. His test accurately describes how judges ought to think and
often do think while in their chambers, but it is not culturally persuasive.
Quite simply, later Justices have not frequently utilized Justice Harlan's
competing considerations test as the form of doctrine to support their judicial
enthymeme.
L. Totality of the Circumstances Test
The Supreme Court recently may have resolved a major constitutional
conundrum in Church of the Lukumi Babuli Aye v. City of Hialeah.1 96
Without a dissent, the Court struck down municipal ordinances that
prohibited believers in the Santeria religion from engaging in ritual animal
sacrifice. 197 Because the ordinances did not mention the Santerians by name,
the city argued the ordinances were facially "neutral" and consequently were
constitutional. 198  Existing First Amendment-Equal Protection doctrines
could not completely resolve the problem. No glaring facial discrimination
existed similar to the explicit segregation of African-American school-
children in Brown v. Board of Education.199 Because so few were affected
by the ordinances and because everyone covered by the narrow terms of the
statute was likely to be prosecuted, plaintiffs could not prove any "stark
pattern" of discriminatory enforcement which would invalidate the
200implementation of an otherwise valid statute or ordinance. Nor could the
case easily be based upon statistics to reveal disparate impact, which would
imply invidious intent. The Court recently had upheld a general state statute
.. . .. 201
banning peyote as applied to Indian religious practices. Indians could not
complain if they were the only ones caught violating the facially neutral202
law. Thus, any constitutional infirmity in Lukumi had to exist primarily in
the ordinances' text, not their application.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy solved the problem by studying
the facially neutral ordinances in light of all the surrounding circumstances to
discover the ordinances' impermissible purposes of targeting and suppressing
"the central element of the Santeria worship." 20 3 The majority did not have
196. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
197. Id. at 2233.
198. Id. at 2227.
199. 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
200. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
201. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
202. See id. at 879.
203. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227.
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to look hard. One resolution sought to ban acts that "certain religions may
propose to engage in . . . which are inconsistent with public morals, peace,
or safety."204 The ordinances exempted Jews' ritualized killings and almost
all other killings of animals aside from religious sacrifice. 205 The legislative
history confirmed the ordinances' suppressive agenda. A crowd applauded
one Councilman's assertion that in pre-revolutionary Cuba "people were put
in jail for practicing this religion." 2
Although he did not use the following phrase, Justice Kennedy created a
new constitutional doctrine-the "stark statute" standard-under which the
Court will look at the totality of circumstances to invalidate statutes that
carefully avoid using constitutionally suspect terms but nevertheless violate
constitutional norms. Consider the following hypotheticals concerning
prohibition of hats in elementary schools. The Court probably would accept
an elementary school regulation banning all hats ina classroom; the school's
need for classroom decorum, discipline, and visibility would most likely
prevail over student self-expression. °20 7  Conversely, the Court would not
permit a school to ban only yarmulkes, because that ban would be aimed at a
Jewish religious practice. Nor would the Court permit the school to enforce
the facially valid law only against Jews wearing yarmulkes (or only against
women or blacks, for that matter). But what about a regulation that only
banned all round, concave hats of less than nine inches? The statute is not
explicitly anti-Semitic and covers everyone wearing similar hats. Under
Lukumi, the Court could apply the "stark statute" test to invalidate the
statute. There can be no doubt that the hypothetical rule is anti-Semitic, that
the neutral language is pretextual.
Although its future remains uncertain, some form of the "stark statute"
test is likely to be the center of subsequent constitutional issues.208  The
Lukumi Justices did not disagree about the "stark statute" technique; they
disagreed about the proper form of doctrine. Justice Scalia's concurrence
claimed that the Court should only have to study the statute's text, not
surrounding circumstances. Once again Justice Scalia advocated rigid
textualism, consistent with his rejection of legislative history in statutory
interpretation and his reliance on text, history, and tradition in constitutional
204. Id. at 2228 (quoting Resolution 87-66).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2231.
207. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (upholding military order that
Orthodox Jew could not wear yarmulke while on duty and in uniform).
208. Justice Scalia construed the state court's construction of a city's Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance to be viewpoint discrimination in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547
(1992).
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interpretation. 209  And once again I am puzzled. Returning to the
hypothetical, how can one determine the significance of a yarmulke without
looking beyond statutory text to learn particular religious practices? How
can one ascertain a new religious symbol or practice without contextualizing
the text? If one purpose of constitutional law is to ferret out unconstitutional
purposes, why not look at the "mischief" that provoked the law in the first
place? How can one know that Jewish kosher practices were exempted
religious practices in Lukumi without knowing something about the Jewish
religion that could only be learned outside the ordinances' text? Because one
purpose of the Constitution is to make sure certain groups are not picked on,
the Court should look more closely when those groups are the center of a
controversy that provokes the hostile majority to take legislative action. The
Court should learn what was said about the religious group and its practices
when those practices were put under a legal cloud. In other words, Justice
Scalia's obsessive textualism makes a lousy enthymeme, because many of us
will be unconvinced by judicial efforts to tease unconstitutional ends
exclusively out of general statutory language. Either the judges will miss
subtle forms of religious persecution or will overreact, finding
unconstitutional discrimination when it may not have existed. 2 10 The Court
will apply the "stark statute" test more accurately by studying the totality of
211surrounding circumstances, not just text.
M. The "Shock the Conscience" Test (and Other Emotional Responses)
One of the peculiarities of American constitutional law is that some of the
Justices most respected for being lawyerly, restrained, and "conservative"
have been quite emotional in their opinions. This article already described
how Justice Harlan's competing considerations test generated an opinion
setting forth a range of arguments and then concluded that one set outweighs
the other, never pretending to find an ultimate standard to resolve the
tension.
209. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990).
210. In his dissent, Justice White accused Justice Scalia of overreacting in discovering
viewpoint discrimination in R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2558. Justice White believed Justice Scalia was
trying to resolve the constitutionality of "politically correct" regulations, not the particular city
ordinance. Id. at 2561; see also Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of
Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 25 (1988) (judges prefer balancing tests to the totality of
circumstances test); Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme
Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 759 (1963) (the court and its role invariably is part
of the balancing equation).
211. By limiting the number of variables, factor tests are slightly more predictable than the
totality of the circumstances test.
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Nor was Justice Holmes a pure rationalist. According to Judge Posner,
Justice Holmes frequently used terse epigrams to demonstrate the limits of
reason.2 12 After all, Holmes' famous description of laws as a manifestation
213
of "felt necessities" emphasizes the feelings that animate the law.
Justice Frankfurter tried to determine how much constitutional protection
state criminal defendants should receive by applying a "shock the
conscience" test.214 He had been appalled when police used a stomach pump
to obtain narcotics a defendant had swallowed. Justice Frankfurter's test
varies from traditional balancing tests by requiring a higher standard of
outrageousness (shocking) while also being purely subjective, a question of
judicial conscience. Litigants have little way of predicting when something
will be so "shocking" that it will disturb a given Justice's conscience, much
less five consciences. Who would be as shocked if the police used a stomach
pump on a terrorist who had swallowed a computer chip containing
information on a planned bombing? It is impossible to escape law's
emotional underpinnings.
Judge Posner, a self-styled "cold" jurist, described his scope of
constitutional review of "foolish statutes":
It might be a foolish statute, but (provided it is constitutional-that
is, not too foolish, not vicious, and not contrary to one of the
specific prohibitions in the Constitution) if it is correctly interpreted
and applied, the judges have done their job and no more can be
asked.z
16
Judge Posner's "too foolish" and "viciousness" tests are overtly laden with
emotion and subjectivity.
N. Conclusory Standards
Courts frequently create rules that by themselves provide no
predictability; they are nothing more than conclusions. For instance, the
Supreme Court upheld special prosecutors in Morrison v. Olson because they
did not impermissibly interfere with the President's authority under Article
11. 217 The circle is complete in an instant. Who, after all, would permit
212. POSNER, supra note 12, at 241.
213. HOLMES, supra note 195, at 5. Holmes also observed that much of law sprang from the
emotion of vengeance. Id. at 6.
214. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
215. Id.
216. POSNER, supra note 12, at 251.
217. 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 818 1995
FORMS OF DOCTRINE
impermissible interferences? The Court has literally said that Congress
violates separation of power principles when it violates separation of power
principles. Such tests are not limited by facts, factors, or even an express
balancing of competing interests. Closer scrutiny of opinions like Morrison
discloses a supporting hodgepodge of facts, arguments, assertions, and
definitions. For instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Ethics in
Government Act gave the Attorney General initial authority to appoint a
special prosecutor and removal power for "good cause., 2 18  Furthermore,
the lower federal court panel had continuing jurisdiction but could only
dismiss the prosecutor when the case appeared finished. 219 Dominated by a
conclusory standard, the form approaches formlessness.
Whether one agrees with Morrison or not, conclusory standards have
traditionally played a major role in American legal doctrine. In tort law,
plaintiffs are liable if they have "caused" injury by acting "unreasonably" or
"negligently." Not all such standards are perpetually vague. Courts and
litigants eventually develop a sense of how cases will be decided by
consulting relevant precedents. As with balancing tests, the "ruleness" of an
initially conclusory standard may become evident over time. From
Morrison, the Supreme Court may eventually develop additional forms to
separate "permissible" from "impermissible" intrusions, or the Court may
eventually create a rule that upholds all special prosecutors not directly
appointed by Congress.
Conclusory balancing tests' formless nature fails to provide clear
directions to future litigants who must attempt to derive a favorable rule
from the case or at least make plausible analogies or distinctions. Courts
220
often resort to formless forms when entering new areas of law. Judges
218. Id. at 660-63.
219. Id. at 664. Congress recently passed a new statute authorizing special prosecutors. 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (West Supp. 1995). The statute contains some significant differences from
the statute the Court upheld in Morrison v. Olson. In particular, the Special Division of the D.C.
Circuit now has more supervisory powers. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 49, 591-599 (West Supp. 1995).
The Morrison Court partially upheld the prior statute because the special court could only terminate
the special prosecutor when the case was "complete" or "substantially completed." 487 U.S. at
664. Consequently, we have no way of knowing if this change, which further entangles the judiciary
in controversial, executive prosecutorial decisions, will shift the balance enough to void the statute.
In other words, we cannot predict by simply looking at Morrison's balancing test, how close the
balance was or will be in the future to tipping towards unconstitutionality.
220. The "conservative" wing of the Supreme Court creates new balancing tests when
necessary. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy,
sifted through a number of variables to decide that Congress had no authority under the Commerce
Clause to ban firearms from public schools in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634
(1995). Joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy defended Rehnquist's "formless form" in a
concurrence:
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may doubt the "correctness" of their decision, privately disagree with each
other over the scope and meaning of the decision behind the facade of the
written opinion, worry about future consequences, or wish to move
gradually until they learn the public reaction to their initial foray. After
several cases have been litigated in a related area, litigants, scholars, and
judges may be able to infer a more rigid rule where only an impulse initially
existed. The formless form is also unstable, because it is so fact specific.
We know that a party won a given case because a certain set of facts
generated a set of reasons and conclusions. Every new case will have
different facts that can provide grounds for additional arguments or
distinctions.
The need for congressional flexibility in designing and regulating the
Executive Branch supports Morrison's outcome and form. Even if one
believes for other reasons that Morrison was wrongly decided, 221 Justice
Scalia's dissent goes too far by condemning the Court for creating
conclusory, lawless standards:
Today's decision on the basic issue of fragmentation of executive
power is ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law. It
extends into the very heart of our most significant constitutional
function the 'totality of the circumstances' mode of analysis that
this Court has in recent years become fond of.222
Justice Scalia's rule formalism separates judicial, executive, and
legislative functions, radically threatening every administrative agency that
[W]e are often called upon to resolve questions of constitutional law not
susceptible to the mechanical application of bright and clear lines. The
substantial element of political judgment in Commerce Clause matters leaves
our institutional capacity to intervene more in doubt than when we decide
cases, for instance, under the Bill of Rights even though clear and bright lines
are often absent in the latter class of disputes.
Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Once again we see the tendency to merge form with content. Instead, the Court should resolve
structural and individual rights cases through the best mixture of bright lines, balancing tests, and
hybrids. It is also worth noting that Justice Scalia, who champions bright lines in structural cases,
was silent.
221. Wilson, supra note 116, at 165-75.
222. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare Skinner ,. Railway Labor
Executive Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) with National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989). In Skinner, Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion which adopted balancing
techniques, including careful scrutiny of the record, to uphold mandatory drug testing of railroad
crew members who were involved in railroad accidents. 489 U.S. at 633-34. Justice Scalia
dissented in National Treasury Employees Union which permitted suspicionless testing of custom
service personnel. 489 U.S. at 680-81.
820 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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combines rulemaking, adjudication, or prosecutorial powers. 223 Yet he also
has disapproved of administrative agencies that only contain legislative
functions. Once again Scalia's. textual fetish excludes important
information. Separation of powers questions are difficult, because they need
to be contextualized. Otherwise, the Court may develop elaborate technical
doctrines that are completely swamped by non-legal shifts in governmental
power. The Morrison Court may have been thinking about the Executive
Branch's recurring habit of breaking laws and violating constitutional
norms. 225  If the Executive Branch had a more honorable record, the case
might have been decided differently. A vague standard, which makes
Morrison a weak precedent that can be easily distinguishable on the facts or
reasons, may be the best way to grope in this difficult area of constitutional
law.
Although most of this article's examples come from public law, its
insights extend to private law. For example, Judge Hutcheson used patent
law to demonstrate how judges rely on "hunches" more than "logic" to
decide if a patent applicant proposed an "inventive" idea instead of a
"mechanical advance." 226  The "inventiveness" standard is a conclusory
restatement of the patent law's purpose, to grant patents to inventions.
Nevertheless, Judge Hutcheson did not find the standard to be either
227
unworkable or undesirable. The vague standard required him to listen
carefully to all sides, mull over the facts and arguments, and wait for the
223. Although he had joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's amorphous decision limiting
congressional power under the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995), Justice Scalia continued his campaign to formalize separation of powers jurisprudence when
he held that Congress cannot reverse final judicial decisions in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 1447 (1995). He explicitly rejected particularized assessment of harm:
[T]he doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard rather than a
remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be
identified. In its major features (of which the conclusiveness of judgments is
surely one) it is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear
distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially
defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.
Id. at 1463.
224. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688.
226. Hutcheson, supra note 22, at 280. The problem of form also had affected maritime tort
law. In Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/P Testbank, 752 F. 2d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
the court of appeals rejected a balancing test: ". . . we disagree with a case-by-case approach
because we think the value of a rule is significant in these maritime decisions." The Court noted
that a rule would keep decisions out of the hands of juries and trial judges, making the law more
predictable "with the vice of creating results in cases at its edge that are said to be 'unjust' or
'unfair.'" Id. at 1029. Rules thus empower appellate courts while standards tend to allocate many
final decisions to juries and judges. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 49 n. 12.
227. Hutcheson, supra note 22, at 280.
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"hunch" to tell him which side should win.228  Neither is the "hunch"
lawless; it reflects precedent, the judge's legal experience, and the judge's
229life experience. The above tort and patent examples suggest that standards
are particularly desirable when the judiciary wants an area of law to evolve
over time in response to ever-changing circumstances and norms.
Sometimes the virtues of flexibility overwhelm the competing values of
predictability and limiting judicial discretion.
0. Combinations
Until now, this article has isolated forms of doctrine. In the real world,
lawyers need a broader field of vision, because most legal areas contain
numerous forms of doctrine. Rules, standards, and hybrids occur in myriad
combinations. Even some of the prior examples were not single forms.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's bright line interpretation of nonjusticiability in
United States v. Nixon sprang from Baker v. Carr's six prong test, a mix of
standards ("impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of the
government") and at least one reasonably directive rule ("a textually
demonstratable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political branch"). 23  Justice Rehnquist's Vermont Yankee opinion contained
a bright line immunizing agency discretion in providing supplementary
procedures from judicial second-guessing and a peephole that permits the
Court to avoid a rigid interpretation of the rule. 231
Another way to conceptualize constitutional legal doctrine is to rank
issues by the amount of deference the Supreme Court gives to the
governmental defendant. Although existing equal protection doctrine always
begins with balancing, it consists of two quasi-rules ("strict scrutiny" and
"rational purpose") and one standard ("intermediate scrutiny"). The
notorious adjective "quasi" needs to be added to the two rules, because they
are not completely predictable. For example, Justices Powell, O'Connor,
and Scalia have applied different conceptions of strict scrutiny to affirmative
232
action cases. In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court is more
228, Id. at 278.
229, Id. at 277.
230. See 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) (using the test of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)).
231. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978).
232. Strict scrutiny of governmental actions that explicitly consider race has at least three
degrees of strictness. Justice Scalia's strict scrutiny would invalidate all affirmative action
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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deferential to legislative findings of harms related to commercial
advertisements of "vice" than of findings of danger caused by political
dissent.233 The Court applies an amorphous balancing test for commercial
speech but a quite rigid rule proscribing governmental suppression of
political viewpoints. 234
P. Metaphors
It is difficult to find one's way through the maze of the law without using
metaphors. Indeed, the two archetype forms of doctrine-"bright lines" and
"balancing tests"-are metaphors. The Supreme Court does not use an
actual scales or draw colorful lines. This article has proposed metaphors like
"escape hatches" and "peepholes" to isolate different forms of doctrine.
Envisioning steam emitting from an "escape hatch" captures that form's
function better than a simple description of the rule. But just as a potent
metaphor can clarify, it also can obfuscate. 235  There is always a risk in
comparing one thing-a legal rule-with another, the. metaphor, which may
contain literary and realistic implications. Future courts have a great deal
of discretion in interpreting most legal metaphors, since there is no direct
correspondence between the legal problem and the chosen image.
programs. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor's strict scrutiny required heavy substantive and procedural requirements. In Shaw
v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), she only invalidated grotesquely shaped congressional districts
instead of all congressional districts that took race into account (which probably would have meant
all congressional districts). Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), to invalidate quotas but to uphold the use of race as a factor to
diversify a state medical school. Id. at 320. But even Justice Scalia would not strike down all
statutes that take race into consideration; he probably would have upheld the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II, deferring to the government for acting pursuant to the benign
motive of national security, a motive that courts could not examine closely. Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In a perverse way, Korematsu is the first affirmative action case. For
a discussion of Justice Scalia's creative deference to claims of national security, see Barry Kellman,
Judicial Abdication of Military Tort Accountability: But Who Is to Guard the Guards Themselves?,
1989 DUKE L.J. 1597, 1622-24, 1651-52.
233. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2707 (1993); cf. Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
234. If one looks at a field of doctrine as broad as "administrative law," the number of forms
explode, ranging from the bright lines in Chadha, peephole in Vermont Yankee, factor test in
Eldridge, to a conclusory standard in Morrison.
235. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 733
(1987) ("Lawyers in general, and judges in particular, coin or adopt metaphors and then forget they
are only metaphors.").
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Despite such risks, courts often include metaphors to persuade and guide
236future litigation. Justice O'Connor recently invoked a provocative
metaphor in New York v. United States while striking down a federal law that
required the State of New York to take title to radioactive nuclear waste or
to assume regulatory responsibility for disposal under congressional
direction. 237 She claimed that the state government's constitutional power
* 238was a "mirror image" of the national government's authority. This
metaphor manages to be vividly accessible and mystically bewildering at the
same time. It is fairly easy to envision the metaphor-the federal
government staring at its likeness, state governments-but it is very hard to
understand, much less to apply to future legal disputes. One can first attack
the metaphor for being wrong; Justice O'Connor is suggesting parity
between the states and the federal government, even though Congress retains
the Constitution's textual trump of the Supremacy Clause (not to mention
many other powers). Justice O'Connor may be arguing that the two powers
never overlap, separated by a mirror. Yet she conceded that Congress had
concurrent power under the Commerce Clause to regulate nuclear waste. 2
39
Congress could regulate nuclear waste; it only chose an unconstitutional
240
means.
But take her description at face value. Who is reflecting whom? Is the
federal government looking at the states? Or are the states on this side of the
mirror? In other words, which government is the reflection, and which one
is reality? When the federal government lifts its right arm, the state will lift
its left arm. What, if anything, does that signify? And which side of the
mirror are we on-whose shoulder are we looking over? Or is it possible
that we were not supposed to look that deeply into the metaphor? Perhaps
Justice O'Connor is only arguing for the illusion of equality, not actual
parity.
The obscure nature of this Wonderland241 metaphor confirms the common
sense intuition that most lawyers, even allowing for their linguistic facility,
don't make good poets. There should be little surprise that metaphors,
which frequently contain a vast range of elusive and allusive traits, are near
236. Justice Cardozo described how metaphors start "as a device to liberate thought, [but] they
end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926); see also Steven L.
Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989).
237. 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992).
238. Id. at 2417.
239. Id. at 2420.
240. Id. at 2423.
241. See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
5 (Ariel Books/Alfred A. Knopf 1986).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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the end of the bright line-balancing test continuum. Although some
metaphors are helpful, perhaps even essential to legal analysis, others leave
us more confused than ever. Like most efforts, judicial metaphors must
survive the test of time. Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" remains
vibrant, attracting some conservatives who might otherwise have preferred a
more authoritarian interpretation of the First Amendment. Justice
O'Connor's mirror image may end up in the attic.
Q. Equity Exceptions
Litigants and judges do not finish their analysis after determining the
existing forms of doctrine that influence a particular area of substantive law,
because Western law has for millennia included an implied equitable
standard. This form's dynamic, unpredictable nature places it at the end of
the rule/standard continuum.24 3  Over two thousand years ago, Aristotle
wrote that judges should not be bound by existing rules and texts. 244 They
sometimes should transcend legal text to satisfy the purposes that inspired the
text:
When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it
which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right,
where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to
correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have
said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had
known. 24
5
Aristotle proceeded beyond originalism to a more substantive conception
of equitable justice: "Equity must be applied to forgivable actions ....
Equity bids us to be merciful to the weakness of human nature. ,246 Equity is
a form of equality, undermining written law. To demonstrate his views,
Aristotle quoted Antigone's plea in Sophocles' Antigone on the supremacy of
242. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
243. Schauer, Exceptions, supra note 7, at 893. The implied equity exception to rules also
does not satisfy Professor Schauer's definition of exceptions as the intersection of two rules.
244. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, reprinted in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1796 (Jonathan Barnes ed. & J.O. Urmson revised trans., 1984).
245. Id. The equity exception can differ from the adverse exception by fulfilling the
underlying purpose of the existing law or by operating because the existing law's underlying
purpose is defective. ARISTOTLE, supra note 193, at 2188. In other words, the equity exception
advances the purposes of the pre-existing rule, while the adverse exception undermines those goals.
Furthermore, equity sometimes is concerned about purposes beyond original legislative intentions.
Id.
246. ARISTOTLE, supra note 193, at 2188-89.
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universal, unwritten principles over the written law. 247  Thus, courts are
caught in an enduring struggle between complying with legal texts and doing
the right thing, between positivism and some form of natural law.
One of Aristotle's enduring attractions is his capacity to shift from
moralist to analyst. Although he had a preferred conception of justice, he
also discussed the rhetorical value of equitable arguments. 48 For example,
both sides in a contract dispute can always invoke a group of predictable
arguments. One side will argue that a written contract is part of the written
law and satisfies the contractors' expectations. In addition, invalidating
written contracts destabilizes the economy by undermining trust and
predictability. The other side will counter with equitable arguments to
invalidate a written contract, claiming fraud, force, injustice, universal law,
the existence of other contracts, or even utility. 249 No bright line determined
which side should prevail; one needs an experienced judge to choose
between these legitimate, rival conceptions of justice, between written text
and equity.
The equity exception indicates how the desirable legal norms of stability,
predictability, and consistency among parties perpetually conflict with
flexibility, responsiveness to unforeseeable consequences and rival
conceptions of equality, such as the judicial commitment to fairness and
purpose. Civilized legal systems contain competing conceptions of equality.
Litigants pleading strict adherence to the text appeal to the need for equal
treatment under that text, while equity litigants request equal treatment under
the purposes of the text or to fulfill basic societal norms. 25° Everyone wants
to be treated individually and equally. The question remains: when should
courts emphasize the unique or the general aspects-of a case?
This cursory examination of equity's relationship to such general ends as
"purpose" or "fairness" demonstrates more generally how various forms of
doctrine are related to particular ends, ranging from predictability to
honoring the Framers' intentions. The conflict between law and equity helps
explain why many legal theorists have attacked particular forms of doctrine.
They seek to preclude a particular end by eliminating the means that best
247. Id. at 2190.
248. Id. at 2190. One level of this article is purely rhetorical-providing lawyers and judges
with a variety of forms of doctrines to choose among and supporting arguments (including
precedent) for those forms.
249. Id. at 2192-94.
250. Thomas Hobbes, who was no sentimentalist, believed that equity should be informed by
the Golden Rule. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 188 (Cambridge ed. 1991) (1651). Judge Posner
claims the tension between rules and standards is a reflection of the conflict between formal justice
and substantive justice. POSNER, supra note 12, at 44, 318.
826 [Ariz. St. L.J.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 826 1995
FORMS OF DOCTRINE
fulfills that end. If one doesn't like judicial discretion and substantive
justice, eliminate equitable exceptions. One way to rebut such proposed
purges is to appeal to tradition. The Western legal system's dual
commitment to law and equity can be easily traced from Aristotle through
Aquinas 251 to the Anglican common law-equity system. 252 One can reject the
system's experience and its triumphs (as well as its failures) in favor of
interpretive abstractions, such as pure textualism. Nevertheless, tradition
and practice should prevail over theory. Courts ought to retain the
American culture's spectrum of conflicting means and ends, in the belief that
the Western legal system has done more overall good than harm. 253 Those
who wish to convert the rule of law into the law of rules have the burden of
proof to show why their radical abstractions are desirable, much less
necessary, much less the only "legitimate" way to adjudicate.
III. TRANSFORMING EXISTING LAW: THE SECOND STAGE OF DOCTRINAL
ANALYSIS
There are many articles and books discussing how courts distinguish
precedent by using different facts, manipulating holdings, changing
substantive doctrines, and asserting different policies. This section briefly
demonstrates how courts also distinguish cases by transforming forms of
doctrine. Litigants who probably will not prevail under existing forms of
doctrine can use these examples as precedents to support their requests for
profound doctrinal alterations in form and content.
A. Transforming Forms
Properly believing that law is inherently fluid, many legal analysts
assume there is little or no place for rigid rules. Admittedly, our legal
system is a dynamic process, resembling the flow of water throughout the
biosphere. Because everything is in flux, the important empirical problem is
251. Aquinas relied on equity to answer affirmatively his question "Whether He who is Under
a Law May Act Beside the Letter of the Law?" ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA
1021 (Richard C. Meyer, trans., 1947).
252. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN AMERICA 11-12 (1990).
253. For discussion of tradition, see Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Future of Legal Scholarship
and the Search for a Modem Theory of Law, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1976); see also David Luban,
Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1991).
254. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING v-viii (1948)
(describing judicial evolution of "known rules").
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determining the rate of change in different areas. Many constitutional
doctrines are as unpredictable as future appointments to the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, property law manifests its importance by its relative
degree of continuity.
To function in these fluid situations, judges and lawyers should first
"freeze" the relevant law concerning the pending case, treating the existing
256doctrine as if it were a completed system. They should initially assume
there will be no change in the law. They then should diagnose the forms of
doctrine contained within the existing caselaw to help them predict how the
parties will fare.257  For example, an abortion-rights lawyer could quickly
determine that a state ban on abortions during the first trimester would be
unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which created a "core
right" to choose to have an abortion before "viability. ,258 The litigator
simply counts the number of days until "viability" and proves that
"viability" occurs well after the first trimester. 259 That same advocate would
255. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988)
("In a sense, hard-edged rules like these ...are what property is all about."). The choice of a
particular form provides only limited value in predicting the rate of change in a given area. Courts
are capable of quickly substituting balancing tests for rigid rules. For instance, the Court quickly
rejected a rigidly formal interpretation of Article III precluding Congress from shifting some
common law private claims to administrative agencies. Compare Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982) (Congress could not confer bankruptcy powers on
federal magistrates who did not have Article III protections) with Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859 (1986) (upholding option to assert contract counterclaim in
administrative proceeding).
256. This two step process helps explain the conflict many law professors and law students
have over the purpose of their inquiry. Many law professors, immersed in legal process and
exposed to myriad doctrinal changes over the decades of their careers, emphasize law's plasticity.
Law students, on-the other hand, want to know what the law "is." They know that many professors
emphasize the dynamic nature of law in class but primarily test them under the first, "frozen" stage
of analysis. Most professors expect the students to apply the existing law, including existing forms,
to new facts, not to transform or ignore existing forms.
257. Holmes' prediction theory has generated much criticism. See Oliver W. Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes' Positivism-An
Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 932-34 (1951). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); H.L.A. Hart, Scandinavian Positivism, 1959
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233; David H. Moskowitz, The Prediction Theory of Law, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 413
(1966). Under this article's two-stage approach, Justice Holmes' prediction theory is relevant at the
initial diagnostic stage but tells us nothing about how and when courts will transform existing forms
or create new forms.
258. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (labeling this right as the "essential holding" of Roe v.
Wade).
259. Of course, even this rule is not completely rigid. "Viability" may change over time as
medical science is able to protect fetuses earlier in the pregnancy. Some constitutional rules are
very rigid. For example, the Court limited state residency requirements for voting to thirty days.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972).
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have far more difficulty determining the unconstitutionality of state
regulations of abortion procedures under Casey's "undue burden" balancing
test.26
This freezing only lasts during the lawyers' primary assessment of
probable outcomes under existing doctrine. When clients seem unlikely to
prevail under the existing forms, lawyers can propose refinements,
alterations, or even repudiations of existing forms of doctrine. In addition,
prevailing forms do not always adequately resolve the pending case, forcing
everyone to design new doctrine to handle the pending case and influence
future related cases. Judges are much more likely to grant relief in difficult
cases when lawyers present them with a remedy, including viable doctrine in
terms of form, that apparently improves the legal system not just for the
winning litigant but also for society. By more precisely mapping out the
roles of forms of doctrine at both the diagnostic and modification stages of
litigation, lawyers can better understand how the law is likely to operate in a
particular case (assuming no change in the doctrine) and how it mutates over
time.
Recent Tenth Amendment doctrine provides a dramatic example. Not
only can judges create new forms to solve new problems, they can also
transform existing forms of doctrine. For many years, the area was
moribund. The Supreme Court had dismissed the text as a "truism" in
United States v. Darby, thereby creating a bright line rule of complete
261deference to Congress. Maryland v. Wirtz reaffirmed'that attitude by
upholding congressionally mandated minimum wage and hour requirements
for State employers.
262
But Justice Rehnquist revived the Tenth Amendment in National League
263of Cities v. Usery. He mixed conclusory arguments with factual
264
observations, as he later would in Morrison v. Olson, to explain why
Congress cannot require states to pay minimum wage or overtime to state
265
employees. For example, he distinguished congressional regulation of
"states as states" from congressional regulation of private individuals. 266 In
addition, the state power to determine wages was both an "undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty" and a function "essential to separate and
260. 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
261. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
262. 392 U.S. 183, 192, 195 (1968).
263. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
264. See 487 U.S. 654, 685-96 (1988).
265. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852.
266. Id. at 845.
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independent existence. ',267 The congressional requirement would have a
"significant impact" on state budgets. It also was "coercive. Finally,
the law "impermissibly interfered" with "integral governmental functions"
that "states have traditionally afforded their citizens." 270  As in Morrison,
Justice Rehnquist had found "impermissible interference" via a potpourri of
claims and facts.
271
Usery's immediate fate demonstrates the vulnerability of the formless
form that lurks beneath conclusory standards. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, private strip mine operators challenged a
federal law requiring them to return used mines to their natural condition.
272
All four Usery dissenters joined the Hodel opinion to convert Justice
Rehnquist's arguments and observations into a three-pronged test. Justice
Rehnquist's assortment of justifications for activist judicial review under the
Tenth Amendment suddenly developed into specific requirements. Tenth
Amendment plaintiffs had to show that the congressional law affected (1)
states as states, (2) an essential attribute of sovereignty, and (3) a traditional
273governmental function. The Hodel Court even added a potential adverse
exception in a footnote: "There are situations in which the nature of the
federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." 274
This opening was far more expansive than an "escape hatch" or a
"peephole," given the Usery dissenters' relentless opposition to any judicial
application of the Tenth Amendment. It was a vast exception designed to
devour whatever remained of the original Usery approach. Thus it came as
little surprise that these five Justices subsequently upheld the application of
the Federal Age Discrimination Act against the states.
Justice Blackmun, who concurred in Usery, overruled Usery in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 276 He determined that lower
courts were unable to apply the Hodel standards coherently, particularly the
"traditional governmental function" test.277  He said he thought Useryestablished a balancing test, but it turned out to be something else (Justice
267. Id.
268. See id. at 846.
269. See id. at 850.
270. Id. at 851.
271. Id.
272. 452 U.S. 264, 268-73 (1981).
273. Id. at 287-88.
274. Id. at 288 n.29.
275. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983).
276. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
277. Id. at 538-40.
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Blackmun never explained what).278  He also attempted to inter Usery by
including a "bright line escape hatch," a gesture toward flexibility that
actually enhanced his rigid rule of deference to Congress, a rule premised
upon the belief that the states were adequately protected by the "political
safeguards of federalism. ,,279 Instead of arguing that all Tenth Amendment
claims were nonjusticiable, which would have effectively precluded
meaningful judicial review, he quoted Justice Frankfurter: "The process of
constitutional adjudication does not thrive on conjuring up horrible
possibilities that never happen in the real world and devising doctrines
sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency."
280
In other words, Justice Blackmun enhanced the strength of his highly
deferential rule by leaving open the possibility of judicial review of
egregious congressional behavior.
Justice O'Connor, a consistent supporter of Tenth Amendment judicial
activism, saw no need to wait for extremities. Or perhaps she thought such
federal abuses already flourished. In New York v. United States,281 she
wrote the majority opinion prohibiting Congress from compelling recalcitrant
states, which refused to fully participate in the regulation of existing nuclear
waste disposal plans, to either take title to unwanted private nuclear waste or
regulate the disposal of private nuclear waste in compliance with federal
law.
282
278. See id. at 561-62 (Powell, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 551 n. 11 (citing Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the State in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954)).
280. Id. at 556 (quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946)). For a useful
discussion of "floodgate" style arguments, see Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 361 (1985).
281. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
282. Id. at 188. The scope of New York remains uncertain. Its limitation to "facial
violations" could be expanded by its prohibition of "coercion," a notoriously vague legal concept.
See id. at 175. The decision also could be narrowed to federal laws that commandeer state
regulatory mechanisms. See id. at 176. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor also included a mysterious
metaphor, arguing that the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause "are mirror images of each
other." Id. at 155-56. Future refinements seem inevitable.
Surveying pending federal health care legislation, Professor Hoke has described seven different
types of federal regulatory schemes that raise Tenth Amendment problems under New York.
Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth Amendment and
Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489, 501-02 (1994). Other scholars are more
critical of New York. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Federalism and Judicial Review: An Update, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577 (1994); Martin H. Redish, Doing It With Mirrors: New York v.
United States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593 (1994).
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The opinion claimed not to overrule Garcia, which involved a "generally
applicable law," 283 a law that applied equally to states and to private parties.
New York voided a statute that facially discriminated against states, while
Garcia had upheld federal wage and hours regulations that affected many
private and public employees. In other words, New York created an
adverse exception, limited to "facial" discrimination, to Garcia's general
rule of judicial restraint. The dissenters argued that the exception was pulled
out of thin air without explanation.
286
But the exception can be justified as part of the Court's general
constitutional jurisprudence of being most skeptical of statutes that expressly
focus on protected classes, rights, or entities. 287 The New York exception
can be defended as a "reverse McCulloch." In McCulloch v. Maryland,
Chief Justice Marshall held that states could not tax federal bank
operations. 288 The Chief Justice explained that states were not accountable
to the federal electorate. 289 States would be tempted to raise taxes on federal
operations either to destroy locally unpopular federal enterprises, or to
receive more in federal receipts than the state citizens would pay in federal
tax revenues. On the other hand, Chief Justice Marshall also held that states
could continue to tax federal land holdings under general revenue laws that
affected everyone "in common," because states would be politically
constrained by their own electorate from excessively raising local, broad-
based taxes. Generally worded statutes raise fewer constitutional
questions than focused statutes, because the majority, which will be covered• • • 291
by the general law, is unlikely to overburden itself. The New York facial
283. New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
284. Id. at 188.
285. 469 U.S. at 557.
286. New York, 505 U.S. at 201 (White, J., dissenting).
287. Categorizing New York as an exception to Garcia is not a neutral process. New York can
be read more broadly to justify overruling Garcia, since Garcia partially was premised upon the
false assumption that the Court could not create judicially manageable standards. See Garcia, 469
U.S. at 538-47.
288. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
289. Id. at 435.
290. Id. at 436.
291. Professor Hoke has argued that the republican process norms underlying New York's
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment warrant extending the case to preclude the federal
government from pressuring states to enter federal programs by taxing private individuals if the
states do not comply. Hoke, supra note 282, at 564-67. That extension would not fit within the
"reverse McCulloch" defense of the exception, which limits Supreme Court interventions to federal
statutes that exclusively aim at states. Furthermore, New York can also be narrowed to its facts, to
situations where the federal government forces states to take title over undesirable private property.
Justice Scalia showed little inclination to limit the Tenth Amendment to states when he wrote that
Congress had to use "clear and manifest language" to "displace traditional State regulation" of
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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exception protects states; Congress is much less likely to abuse states under
general statutes which would also injure its broader constituency. This
argument not only justifies the exception but also limits its scope. The
internal validity of the exception and the exception's ability to coexist with
the rule are both important, because on another level New York directly
threatened Garcia. Garcia justified the withdrawal of judicial review on the
ground that the Court could not create coherent Tenth Amendment
29229doctrine, a claim New York effectively refuted.293
This abbreviated review of Tenth Amendment doctrine demonstrates how
much can be understood simply by focusing on forms of doctrine. It also
shows how the majority of the Court chooses the particular form that best fits
its substantive concerns, whether those be federalism, judicial restraint, or
judicial competence to formulate viable doctrine. More generally, the Tenth
Amendment cases stand as a set of precedents that permit courts to alter
forms of doctrine in any other area.
B. Limited Supreme Court Sovereignty and the Art of Overruling
Applying the concept of "sovereignty" to the American legal system is
one of the more difficult American jurisprudential problems. There are no
obvious answers to determining who has the last word; how they can
exercise it; and when they have it. Is the President sovereign during a time
of Civil War? The average soldier when ordered to fire upon rebellious
citizens? The people? The electorate? The amendment process under
Article V? Doesn't Congress have some form of majoritarian legislative
sovereignty? The Tenth Amendment cases reflect judicial disagreements
over the meaning of state sovereignty. John Stuart Mill claimed individuals
also have a sphere of sovereignty: "Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign." 294 This complexity constitutes another
virtue of the American legal system, exemplifying its divide and conquer
approach to power.295
bankruptcy foreclosure sales. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1765 (1995)
(quoting English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1970)). Thus there are nascent,
competing forms that lurk throughout current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
292. 469 U.S. at 531.
293. See New York, 505 U.S. at 155-69.
294. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989)
(1859).
295. Americans have long been ambivalent about the concept of sovereignty. See Louis
HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 43-50 (1991).
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This section shall focus on yet another example of limited sovereignty:
Supreme Court sovereignty. On one level, the ever-changing majorities on
the Supreme Court have limited sovereignty, because they are not absolutely
bound by prior Supreme Court decisions. Supreme Court majorities cannot
"entrench" their opinions to protect them from future Supreme Court
majorities. For example, no doctrine or rule can preclude five future
Justices from adopting Judge Learned Hand's argument that Marbury v.
Madison296 was wrongly decided, because the constitutional text does not
authorize Supreme Court review over congressional legislation, 297 or from
overruling McCulloch v. Maryland, perhaps by aggressively using Dean
Choper's argument that all federal-state issues are nonjusticiable. The
Court could legitimately withdraw from all constitutional judicial review
until the country passed an appropriate amendment. Only the populace can
use the amendment process either to entrench or to repudiate permanently
Supreme Court doctrine.
This fundamental instability to all Supreme Court doctrine reveals the
quixotic nature of Justice Scalia's attempt to limit judicial discretion through
formal rules. Five Justices can overrule any judicial rule. Overruling is the
penultimate legal loophole (formal constitutional amendment is the ultimate
loophole). Consequently, constitutional law never can provide complete
predictability. But Justice Scalia's quest for certainty is not just futile; it
approaches the paradoxical. He seeks to overrule decisions that he believes
were "illegitimately" decided, either because of their improper modes of
reasoning (using public opinion or personal morality, for instance) or their
form of doctrine (particularly noxious standards). But future Courts can use
his transformations and reversals as precedents to reject his particular
outcomes and rules, and as more general examples of how one Justice's
particular judicial ideology and innovative legal theory can legitimately
trump existing judicial practice. Overall, Justice Scalia's aggressive, abstract
jurisprudence may well increase future judicial discretion. If he can
transform constitutional doctrine and practice under a rigid set of theoretical
criteria, who knows how other ambitious Justices, who may have radically
different jurisprudential views, will use his example in the future?
296. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
297. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 4-30 (1958).
298. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 233-35
(1980).
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IV. LIMITS OF THEORY
This article has made several descriptive claims. First, there are many
more forms of doctrines than the two forms-formal rules and ad hoc
standards-which academics and judges have primarily contrasted. Second,
this survey of forms reinforces the frequently made assertion that rules
advance predictability and limit judicial discretion, while standards promote
flexibility. It also conveys how many other substantive ends the forms can
serve. Forms help determine which side probably will win, how a court will
analyze an issue, what evidence is relevant, and how the case will be
processed through the legal-political system.
The article also makes the normative claim that the additional forms
appropriately fulfill different functions in different cases, providing good
"fits" between form and content. Hybrids like escape hatches and peepholes
strengthen rules, while factor tests simplify litigation and advance particular
substantive ends by emphasizing certain facts and arguments at the expense
of others.
This normative claim is harder to verify. Lawyers have difficulty
proving the longer-term consequences of particular decisions, particularly
major constitutional decisions, because the law is interacting with complex
human beings who contend with many other variables, legal and non-legal,
over long periods of time. For instance, nobody can be sure what effect
Milliken v. Bradley's refusal to extend desegregation by busing into the
suburbs299 had on race relations because so many other factors-continual
racism, "crack" cocaine, unemployment, widespread anti-intellectualism, the
growth of hedonism, and the effects of cases ranging from Brown to Bakke-
also affected the races. Furthermore, once the Court makes a major decision
in one direction, nobody can prove what would have happened if the Court
had gone the other way.
The political partisans who dominate contemporary American political
discourse usually interpret subsequent events in a way that reinforces their
previously held positions. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union
maintains that a bright line excluding all prayers from public schools300 has
prevented increased religious antagonism and has had a positive effect on
social mores by promoting diversity and tolerance. Opponents contend that
such a formal rule exacerbates religious differences and undermines
morality. None of us can be sure who is correct, because we cannot rerun
our society over the last thirty years to ascertain what would be the different
299. 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974).
300. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
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effects, if any, of different constitutional doctrine in form and content. None
of us can ever know what our society would now look like if mandatory
school prayer had remained legal. Perhaps the country would be basking in
rectitude if we had all prayed when we were young school-children. But
then our society might have degenerated into Northern Ireland or even
Bosnia.
Despite such verification difficulties, the article made the additional
normative claim that a large variety of forms, including all the forms
studied, should exist. The article's main tool of persuasion has been its case
examples. The examples carry the authority of legal precedent, legal
tradition, the legal culture's sense of proper fits between ends and means,
and the lawyerly intuition that a complicated world cannot be simplistically
ruled. This article is a massive empirical enthymeme, eschewing formal
logic in favor of examples, appealing to widely held beliefs, and predicting
consequences. One cannot logically refute those who have a bright line
fetish or those who dread rigidity. One can only delineate the potentially
adverse consequences of rejecting all the forms of doctrine that are not pure
bright lines like Chadha, or formless, conclusory balancing tests like
Morrison.
I am somewhat tempted to conclude the article at this moment. After all,
one of my complaints has been that legal theorists tend to extend their
initially illuminating insights to areas where their previously valid
perspective distorts more than clarifies, creating numerous straw arguments
in the process. Legal academics are frequently guilty of an excessive degree
of inference.
Such a dodge, however, would fail to address an important question:
Why have so many contemporary lawyers and judges taken such strong
positions on the rule/standard debate? One reason is that their claims are not
completely unfounded. There is a relationship between different forms of
doctrine and different judicial ends, between form and content. There is also
a link between forms of doctrines and the role of the judiciary, between form
and structure. These relationships tempt theorists to weed out completely not
only unwanted ends, but also any means that sometimes serve those ends.
The problem, of course, is that those means also serve other ends, including
some of the theorists' ends. A feminist who dislikes rules, seeing them as
disguised forms of sexism or residual phallocentricism, might nevertheless
prefer the more rule-like, aggressive, strict scrutiny balancing test in gender
discrimination cases instead of the Supreme Court's amorphous intermediate
301. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP
108 (1988).
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scrutiny standard. The remainder of this section shall evaluate some Right,
Left, and Center views of the rule/standard dispute.
A. The Right
The conservative political philosopher Michael Oakeshott observed that
rationalism has permeated modem conservatism almost as much as
contemporary liberalism. 30 2  Oakeshott criticized Friedrich Hayek for
elevating abstractions above tradition, accepting only a minimalist state.
That approach turned Hayek into a theoretical rationalist, resembling the
303socialists he loathed. According to Oakeshott, rationalists also err by
emphasizing technique at the expense of practice. 304  They try to solve
everything rigidly and systematically, instead of contextualizing particular
problems within the appropriate tradition or practice.
To the degree that Justice Scalia leads and inspires modern American
conservative politics, his constitutional jurisprudence demonstrates that
whatever else modern American conservatism is, it is not Oakeshott's
traditional conservatism. Justice Scalia claims to be "conservative" but
dreams of finding the interpretive Holy Grail amidst the perpetual squalor of
political-legal conflict. Both his quest for right answers and his reification of
textualist technique reflect the Rationalists' loathing of tradition.30 5  The
belief in one right answer or one right technique undercuts the tentative,
evolutionary natures of private and constitutional common law. It also
substitutes the appearance of logic for the Aristotelian concept of
enthymemes. By praising or demonizing particular techniques that have long
been used by American courts, such as utilizing many doctrinal forms and
modes of argument, Justice Scalia has submerged careful practice to his
abstractions. To put the claim more concretely, Justice Scalia's
constitutionalization of "tradition" by counting statutes in cases like Michael
H.306 rings a bit hollow, when his other theories of constitutional and
302. MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 26 (Foreword by Timothy Fuller, 1991) (1962).
303. Id. Hayek's rationalism covered the bright line-balancing test controversy. He only
accepted rigid rules and loathed discretionary standards. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM 72-87 (1944).
304. OAKESHOTT, supra note 302, at 11-17.
305. Whether it be law and economics or originalism, many contemporary conservatives are
enamored with grand theory. As then-Judge Bork explained: "To approach the subject of economic
rights it is necessary to state a general theory about how a judge should deal with cases which
require interpretation of the United States Constitution." Robert H. Bork, The Constitution,
Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986).
306. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-27 (1988).
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statutory interpretation repudiate as illegitimate thousands of prior cases'
reasoning, forms, and outcomes.
Oakeshott's conservatism is premised on the belief that nobody fully
understands how a particular society functions and flourishes. Consequently,
everyone should be wary of employing their ideas to change radically the
system and culture, whether those aggressive changes come from below in
revolutionary dress or from above as rigid theories of constitutional
interpretation. Thus, the burden of proof is on those "conservatives" who
want to transform current legal techniques. This article has tried to reinforce
the norm of judicial prudence by revealing some of the concerns that judges
ought to consider when choosing between differing forms and by
demonstrating some of the pragmatic benefits of having a vast array of
forms.
Ideological purists, who require rigid judicial compliance not just with
their ends but also with a narrow set of means, also face the more prosaic
problem of remaining consistent, unless they woodenly pursue only one end.
Justice Scalia praises bright lines but sometimes must balance. He consults
"tradition" to determine the extent of governmental power, but tradition can
conflict with principle and clear-cut rules. The American people develop
their traditions without much concern for consistency. Justice Scalia has
approved of such exceptions to a rigid separation-of-Church-and-State rule as
legislative chaplains and the motto on American currency, "In God We
Trust. '007 In his typically sardonic way, Justice Scalia condemned balancing
tests for attempting to compare incommensurables: "It is more like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." 3°8 But
are not text, history, principle, and tradition, his preferred modes of thought,
often incommensurate?
B. The Left
Karl Popper maintained that the Left is even more bedeviled by excessive
rationalism than the Right. 309 Still influenced by Hegel and Marx, leftists
tend to believe they can scientifically diagnose and cure all of society's ills.
Their truths are self-evident and live in harmony. Because they know what
307. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673 (1989) (Kennedy, I., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justice Scalia, discussing the American motto, and citing with
approval Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
308. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988).
309. See, e.g., KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOLUME II, THE
HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY: HEGEL, MARX, AND THE AFTERMATH (1966).
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is "reasonable," anyone who disagrees with them must be "prejudiced."
Indeed, many members of the Left are attracted to conspiracy theories to
explain why their self-evident truths do not immediately triumph. 310 They
gain excessive confidence in their beliefs, because few would disagree that
our society suffers from class conflict, sexism, racism, and cultural
intolerance.
Their fury at the American judiciary, which refuses to adopt all of their
ends immediately or completely, leads them to attack the entire legal
enterprise. All existing judicial ends and means become suspicious, because
some judicial means and ends do not satisfy their substantive standards. If
some or all of the judges are class warriors or sexists, then it follows that all
their means are equally tainted. Rules are no longer tools available to
decisionmakers of all ideological perspectives, but become venal weapons of
oppression. Thus, the leftist zeal to purge the system of prejudice creates a
prejudice against judicial means that traditionally has been used to advance a
wide range of ideologies. The Left and Right end up resembling each other
by strictly applying different litmus tests to both judicial ends and judicial
means to determine if a particular decision is politically correct.
At the least, leftists feel they have successfully indicted the legal system
by demonstrating its lack of logic. Roberto Unger described modern
liberalism as riddled with antimonies-logical contradictions. 311 Thus, they
claim that balancing tests' indeterminacies or courts' fluctuations between
forms reveals liberalism's incoherence. Technical problems are translated
into core dilemmas of political philosophy.
This article's examples demonstrate that there is no "logical"
contradiction in using different means to satisfy conflicting ends. Legal
opinions are enthymemes, not logical syllogisms. One should not expect
complete coherence, because all legal enthymemes are premised upon
prevailing public norms, which are not and need not be completely internally
consistent. Most of us are understandably ambivalent about our fellow
citizens. For instance, each of us wants to be treated individually
(substantive justice) and equally (formal justice). Less abstractly, most of us
are torn between maximizing one's own advantage and generating a civil,
stable society. The legal Left's fascination with theory is particularly tragic,
because leftist lawyers need to use all available technical tools to alter
310. See POPPER, supra note 74, at 7 ("The conspiracy theory of ignorance is fairly well
known in its Marxian form as the conspiracy of a capitalist press that perverts and suppresses truth
and fills the workers' minds with false ideologies.").
311. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 51-55 (1975); see also Roberto M.
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1984).
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society. Their clients cannot afford the luxury of lawyers trained exclusively
in grand theory, "correct" outcomes, and indifference to legal technique.
C. The Center
Most law professors consciously or unconsciously accept Holmes'
observation that law raises questions of degree more than questions of
kind.312  Indeed, this article has shown that there are degrees of
predictability within different forms of doctrine. Law professors want their
students to manipulate doctrine to benefit clients. Lawyers should not see
legal doctrine as a cookbook; law is far more pliable. Clients, after all, want
to escape adverse existing law while preserving supportive doctrine.
Furthermore, lawyers and many clients have a vested interest in
indeterminacy, in being able to make legal distinctions based upon "policy"
or whatever else courts think is appropriate. As a result, the underlying
ideology of most law school classes is a blend of low-grade skepticism and
pragmatism that can degenerate into amoral relativism. Such attitudes tend
to be confirmed by experience; law professors who have taught for many
years have witnessed and studied many cultural, political, and legal changes.
The Legal Realists demonstrated how allegedly "scientific" legal rules
invariably included controversial policy judgments. But many Realists
jumped from that valid observation to condemn all formal rules. Judge
Jerome Frank thought rules emanated from unresolved Freudian
problems. 313 Grant Gilmore dismissed formal rules as retrograde
methodology.314 Contemporary pragmatists like Professor Strauss find rules
to be so crude as to be dysfunctional.3 15 As with the Right and the Left, the
skeptical Center made its potent insights too global.
One can be skeptical and pragmatic and still prefer rules. There is no
need to fall into relativism, much less nihilism. David Hume moved beyond
312. In a letter to Professor Freund, Holmes observed that "pretty much the whole body of
law ...[is] a matter of degree." Douglas H. Ginsburg, Afterword to Harry Kalven, Jr., Ernst
Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 245 (1973) (quoting F.
FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 76-77 (2d ed. 1961)).
313. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 18-21, 249-50 (1930). H.L.A. Hart, in
turn, diagnosed rule-skeptics like Frank: "The rule-skeptic is sometimes a disappointed absolutist."
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135 (1961).
314. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977) ("Langdell [the founder of
legal formalism] seems to have been an essentially stupid man who, early in his life, hit on one
great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the tenacity of genius .... Langdell's idea was
that law is a science."); see also Ellen A. Peters, Grant Gilnore and the Illusion of Certainty, 92
YALE L.J. 8 (1982).
315. Strauss, Baby, supra note 3, at 818.
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his dizzying philosophical skepticism, which even undermined the concept of
causation, to advocate general rules for the distribution and regulation of
property. 31 6 Judge Posner recently wrote that pragmatism can use neither
rules nor standards. 317 Kathleen Sullivan concluded that rules and standards
rest on a continuum available to all factions.
31 8
Nevertheless, there seems an almost irresistible impulse to make overly
generalized claims about rules and standards. Judge Posner claimed that
rules tend to benefit minorities. Obviously he was not referring to Southern
segregation laws, which were breathtakingly formal. Furthermore,
minorities presently benefit from Yick Wo's "stark pattern" test and Lukumi's
"stark statute" test, neither of which is a pure rule. Carefully studying
recent Supreme Court cases, Professor Sullivan concluded that the Court's
"center" has preferred balancing tests, while the wings, led by Justices
Brennan and Scalia, gravitate toward rules. Even if that claim reasonably
describes current practice, it cannot be applied more universally. Justice
Douglas did whatever he felt like. We have seen Chief Justice Rehnquist use
a plethora of forms. Relatively conservative Justices like Frankfurter,
Harlan, 3 19 Stewart, 32 and Clark 32 frequently resorted to balancing tests.
Nor should bright lines be equated with "core rights" or other important
interests. The First Amendment contains a medley of forms designed to best
protect the fundamental right to free speech.
This article's relentless use of examples is consistent with its primary
claim that theory should not devour practice and technique. I do not know
how to "prove" that all the previously discussed forms are useful and valid,
any more than I can "refute" those who prefer a single form. The numerous
examples are appeals to the reader's experience in evaluating legal
controversies and to the reader's sense of the proper fit between ends and
means. These examples, which could be increased a thousand-fold, also
316. Hume's skepticism did not prevent him from creating rigid, legal rules. DAVID HUME,
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 526 (L. Selby-Bigge 2d ed. 1978) (1740).
317. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 27 n.41; see also Steven H. Shriffin, Liberalism,
Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1983) (balancing need not be equated
with either instrumentalism or cost-benefit analysis).
318. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 57.
319. Justice Harlan struck down a law regulating birth control because "... the enactment
violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
320. Justice Stewart created a famous obscenity test: "But I know it when I see it ..
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
321. Justice Clark would have only required reapportionment when a state's majority was
"stymied" from changing the system by an entrenched minority. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 259
(1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
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establish the massive destabilization and loss of judicial flexibility that would
be created by devotion to a sole form.
There is another reason to defend technique. What frequently passes for
"theory" these days is little more than a cluster of fashionable positions
allegedly linked to such reassuring premises as efficiency, justice, or
equality. Many jurisprudential authors seem to be satisfied once they have
asserted what they believe are proper conclusions; they dismiss technical
skill as a minor, even squalid concern that can be easily resolved by their
more grandiose jurisprudential abstractions. In the real world, lawyers and
law students need to master technique so they can adequately compete on
behalf of their clients, and if they are lucky or willful, on behalf of their
particular conception of justice.
Such ambiguous responses may leave many readers dissatisfied. They
will want to know exactly when a court should use a particular form. My
inability to answer that question confirms Aristotle's observation that
political-legal decisionmaking is more an art than a science. 322 Choosing the
proper form is part of a simultaneous equation, which arguably includes at
least the following other factors: the plaintiff's interests, defendant's
interests, ease of formulating a remedy, nature of the claim (constitutional
versus statutory or common law), foreseeable costs and benefits of favoring
either party, degree of concern about future abuses by similar parties, nature
of those abuses, prior record of similar parties, any relevant statutory or
constitutional text, purposes of that text, legislative history, subsequent
history, mischief that the text was attempting to cure, structure of the system
the text created, judicial competence, role of the judiciary, precedent,
judge's personal views and experiences, public opinion, judge's sense of
self-confidence, concerns about future discretion, evidentiary problems, and
competing legitimate ends, both substantive and judicial process, that judges
must try to achieve. The very length of this list demonstrates that the
question of form is only part of the adjudicative equation.
V. CONCLUSION
Periodically, while teaching or thinking about constitutional law, I have
been overwhelmed by frightful uncertainty. This vertigo could occur at any
moment but often arose while dismissing a judicial opinion, a student's
comment, or an exam answer as "conclusory," a rebuttal which sounded
conclusory at such a time. Perhaps I had partially internalized the perpetual
322. ARISTOTLE, supra note 193, at 2152.
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panic of some of my better students, who were working through classes not
all that different than this article. After all, they had pressing instrumental
reasons to find out what I was looking for. How disturbing it must have
been for them to sense that at many levels I was more bewildered than they
were. During one such classroom moment, I told them that analyzing
constitutiohal law problems resembled the advertisement describing James
Arness's battle against gigantic radioactive ants in the movie Them! The ad
went something like this: "For every one that is killed, there are two
more. "323  For some reason, this analogy did not seem to reassure my
students, so I explained that I had never found any ultimate meaning to life.
How could they expect me to discover it in legal doctrine?
So much for epiphanies. My immediate classroom solution has been to
emphasize technique (also the focal point of this article). Lawyers and
judges who are insufficiently self-conscious about their craft are more likely
to injure their clients. Lawyers need to crunch doctrine, to know how courts
employ such devices as forms of doctrine and tools of doctrine (alternatives,
burdens of proof, etc.) to implement their choices among competing ends.
Mastery of technique, however, is not enough. The forms of doctrine are
like rules of grammar; they reveal underlying structures of judicial thought
but provide little guidance in how to apply those structures in any particular
situation. It is easier to know the difference between a subject and a verb
than to write a decent sentence. It is likewise more difficult to create a good
"fit" between a form of doctrine and a desired outcome than to reveal the
existence of forms. The proper form, after all, is partially premised upon
uncertain predictions. Bereft of formal logic or confirmation via scientific
methodology, judicial choices of forms of doctrine can only resonate within
our legal tradition as a powerful enthymeme. 324  Reading and analyzing
thousands of cases in law school develops an "ear" for arguments that may
work in related situations, for developing the experience that is part of any
powerful tradition.
Neither is practice, elegantly fitting ends with means, sufficient. Sadism
can be inflicted ever so exquisitely. American lawyers and judges need to be
empowered by technique, informed by practice, and grounded in their
traditions, but they ultimately must return to theory, to deciding what is right
and wrong and what can be done to improve their society and government.
323. The image is ultimately derived from the Greek myth of the Hydra, a monster who
spawned two heads for every one chopped off.
324. Because they are backed by neither authority nor force, law review articles must make
compelling enthymemes, enhanced by relevant examples, to be persuasive.
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